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ABSTRACT PAGE
In the hot, dry summer of 1769 something extraordinary occurred in the bustling port of 
Charleston. After two years of resisting calls from their “sister colonies” to protest, within 
two weeks Charleston possessed two mutually antagonistic associations calling for halting 
imports. Where once “silent Neglect” met appeals for resistance to the Townshend 
Revenue Acts, by the summer of 1769 concerned Charleston residents exchanged “bitter” 
accusations of complicity and a cacophony of “aspersions” against Parliamentary tyranny. 
In a city long “famous for our Harmony,” each port resident -  from the wealthiest merchant 
to the poorest Jack Tar -  faced choices; this thesis seeks to recreate how contemporaries 
understood this moment of contested protest and their own involvement. To dissect how 
colonists came to protest, this paper examines how Charleston residents understood their 
position within the British Empire, traces how conflict over protest arrived amid inaction, 
and uncovers the drive by the anxious whites towards consensus amid a community 
characterized by a majority enslaved and restive sailor population. In capturing the range 
of possibilities for Charleston citizens, the narrative suggests how individuals calculated 
risk versus reward to engage in protest, why protest emerged within this community, and 
the relationship of these protests to the coming revolution.
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For H. Timothy Perry 
I f  Not For You...
Teeming with commerce, the piers of colonial Charleston 
"appear[ed]" as if "a...floating market." Boats from across the Atlantic 
unloaded goods while great "numbers of Canoes [and river] Boats" 
brought plantation crops down river to ocean vessels converging on 
the bustling port city.1 A merchant from Newport wandered the 
streets of Charleston in 1764, dazed at the city's meteoric population 
growth accompanied by a building boom of what he judged to be the 
most "handsome houses" in all the American colonies. From the busy 
wharves down Broad Street, the city unfolded before him into an 
impressive "new world."2 At the center of town, the new State House 
and St. Michael's Church dominated the skyline, while surrounding 
shops sold every possible necessity and luxury for "cash or credit."
The center of trade for the Southern region, Charleston glittered 
as a bright star in the constellation of the British ports, intimately 
connected to harbors in the West Indies, the Northern Colonies, 
Southern Europe, Africa, and the British Isles. With boats coming and 
going daily from St. Augustine, Poole, Salem, Tortuga, London, 
Falmouth, Philadelphia, Rhode Island, Antigua, Halifax, Firth,
1 Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution. (New York Am o Press, 
1970), 5; Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full o f  Money:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the Eighteenth 
Century South Carolina Elite,” in Money, Trade, and Power, Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s 
Plantation Society, eds. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and RandyJ. Sparks (Columbia: 
University o f South Carolina Press, 2001), 312-3.
2 In 1730, Charleston merchants gained an exception to the Navigation Acts allowing direct 
importation o f rice into Southern Europe without first shipping through English ports. Public 
Records o f South Carolina MSS, XXTV, 313, hereafter cited as P.R.S.C.; Leila Sellers, Charleston 
Business on the Eve of Revolution (New York Am o Press, 1970), 5.
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Jamaica, Newcastle, St. Christopher, Boston, New York, Grenada, 
Beaufort, Georgia, Bordeaux, Liverpool, Lisbon, Oporto, Barbados, 
Cork, and Georgetown, Charleston's consumers literally possessed the 
world at their fingertips.3 Local newspapers brimmed with 
advertisements announcing the arrival of the latest ships bringing a 
"Compleat ASSORMENT of German, Dutch, Russia, and Flemish" 
cloth, "French horns, trumpets, and fiddles," "Dutch herrings," and 
commodities from "LONDON and BRISTOL" into their store. 
Customers who read these advertisements for all variety of "VERY 
CHEAP" imports, learned that merchants also offered "empty cases, 
stone jugs, dripping stones, RUM and other SPIRITS, MADERA, 
MALMAY, VIDONIA and OTHER WINES" from Europe and the West 
Indies.4 Reflecting this opulence, Charleston's elite merchants and 
planters fashioned their city -  America's fourth largest -  as a brick and 
mortar testimony to their economic and political dominance.
When Charleston's wealthiest residents stepped from their 
"sumptuous houses" onto the street, they contacted a vibrant and 
raucous port town primarily inhabited by sailors, slaves, and
3 This list o f ports, comes from a Marine list on The South Carolina Gazette, November 23,1769, 
January 12, 1769; from Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full ofMoney:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the 
Eighteenth Century South Carolina Elite,” 312-3.
4 For this paper, I have maintained the misspellings, capitalizations, and italics from the primary 
sources, both to preserve accuracy as well as emphases. The South Carolina Gazette, January 12, 
1769.
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mechanics (independent shopkeepers and artisans).5 The trade in rice 
and indigo that enriched Charleston's wealthy planters and merchants 
required the labor of lower classes -  who in turn supported the stores, 
dramshops, tippling houses, brothels and inns that lined the city's 
wharves and lanes. From the marketplace to the streets, colonial 
Charleston was a dynamic place of interaction and contest defined by 
the constant movement of bodies and goods in and out of port.
In the hot, dry summer of 1769 something extraordinary 
occurred in this bustling port city. After two years of resisting calls 
from their "sister colonies" to protest, within two weeks Charleston 
possessed two mutually antagonistic associations calling for halting 
imports. Where once "silent Neglect" met appeals for resistance to the 
Townshend Revenue Acts, by the summer of 1769 concerned 
Charleston residents exchanged "bitter" accusations of complicity and 
a cacophony of "aspersions" against Parliamentary tyranny.6 In a city 
long "famous for our Harmony," each port resident -  from the 
wealthiest merchant to the poorest Jack Tar -  faced choices; this essay 
seeks to recreate how contemporaries understood this moment of 
contested protest and their own involvement. To dissect how colonists 
came to protest, this paper examines how Charleston residents
5 Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full of Money:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the Eighteenth Century 
South Carolina Elite,” 313.
6 P.R.S.C. (British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56;
3
understood their position within the British Empire, traces how 
conflict over protest arrived amid inaction, and uncovers the drive by 
the anxious whites towards consensus amid a community 
characterized by a majority enslaved and restive sailor population. In 
capturing the range of possibilities for Charleston citizens, the 
narrative suggests how individuals calculated risk versus reward to 
engage in protest, why protest emerged within this community, and 
the relationship of these protests to the coming revolution.7
The People of Charleston 
In his regular reports to London, Lieutenant Governor William 
Bull Jr. described the population of Charleston for the King's ministers. 
Counting only the white residents, Bull estimated that approximately 
5,030 individuals resided within the city. From this total, Bull preceded 
-  like most Charleston residents -  to sort the propertied individuals 
into one of three 'interested' classes.8 This demarcation is best 
understood as akin to modern political parties (people of shared 
economic, ideological, and social position), rather than an immutable 
socio-economic class.9 Throughout the colonial period, propertied
7 This paper seeks to complicate the narrative established by Pauline Maier’s From Resistance to 
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765- 1776. (New  
York: Norton 1972).
8 William Bull to early o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768, PRO, reel 10, vol. 32; Richard Walsh, 
Charleston’s Sons cfUberty: A  Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University o f South 
Carolina Press 1968),ix.
9 The multifarious business investments and partnerships o f  Charleston leave these interest 
groups appearing -  in retrospect — amorphous and impossibly confused. Historians have
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whites identified themselves as members of either the planter, 
mechanic, or merchant groups. In principle, each faction organized 
around their distinct economic interest and political ideologies; for 
example, they selected their own candidates for office and, when 
necessary, petitioned the home government independently. In 
practice, groups vigorously jockeyed for power within the colonial 
port.
Newspaper broadsides illustrate the interwoven economics of 
the propertied interests. Advertisements frequently publicized the 
variety of wholesale goods merchants marketed to mechanics, 
reported runaway slaves leased to mechanics by planters, and 
described partnerships of planters and merchants speculating in 
plantation land. Together the planter and merchant interests 
dominated Carolina politics to the determent of Charleston's mechanic 
interest (as well as backcountry residents and the colony's non- 
propertied residents), by requiring that members of the Commons 
House of Assembly -  the only elected branch of colonial government- 
possess at least five hundred acres of land and ten slaves (or the
attempted to sort individuals disc reedy and to treat these categories as markers o f future 
Revolutionary allegiance, but I find the categories prove woefully problematic. The interest 
groupings are important in the various alliances, but simply are not reflected in the unchanging 
lists o f individuals that some historians have produced. For another historian’s treatment, see 
Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty: A  Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press 1968), ix.
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equivalent value in city property).10 When economic winds shifted, 
however, this traditional merchant-planter collusion devolved into 
competition. In a business climate that encouraged the pursuit of 
economic gain in every possible form, political sympathy and 
economic self-interest often ran in multiple directions and constantly 
adjusted in response to local and imperial conditions.
The semi-fluid, semi-rigid categories of merchant, mechanic and 
planter into which contemporaries sorted themselves substantially 
influenced political discourse in Charleston. Contemporaries * 
understood the political climate through the perspectives of their 
respective group, and participated in protest accordingly. The 
demarcation of group membership, however, proves nearly impossible 
to generalize in retrospect. For example, Christopher Gadsden was 
often referred to as "the Sam Adams of the South" and served a 
leading light of the mechanics, but also owned substantial tracks of 
plantation land (so could be a member of the planter interest), as well 
as, a large shipping wharf (similar to many of the members of the 
merchant interest). In the economics and politics of Charleston, these 
alliances mattered in the day-to-day running of the port, as well as, to 
contemporary's understanding of their place within the British Empire.
10 Jonathan Mercantini, Who ShallKule at Home? The Evolution of South Carolina Political Culture, 1748 
— 1776 (Columbia: The University o f South Carolina Press, 2007), 4.
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The majority of Charleston's residents lived their lives outside 
of the propertied interests. Observing their city, their colony, and their 
Empire, the 'interested classes' (i.e. merchant, planter, mechanic) 
defined themselves against these colonial 'others' including -  an 
enslaved black majority, angry farmers tilling the backcountry, nearby 
Native Americans, the ever-threatening Spanish and French colonists, 
and countless itinerate sailors who daily arrived in the city from 
around the world. Despite their "Grand Modell" for a genteel town, 
Charleston elites uneasily coexisted with these 'other' port denizens, 
often complaining of the "abandonly rude, unmannerly, insolent, and 
shameless" behavior of the city's lower-class sailor and slave majority. 
As elites drove through the city in sedan chairs and carriages, they 
spoke bitterly of idle slaves and sailors playing dice, smoking pipes, 
and "profanely swearing, cursing, and talking obscenely."11 Despite 
its reputation for harmony, even at the best of times- when rice prices 
boomed and trade buoyed the economic fortunes of all -  tensions 
abounded within Charleston. At times of crisis and economic decline, 
the uneasy consensus threatened to collapse.
The Coming of Townshend -1765-1767
11 Historian Philip Morgan estimates that black slaves alone constituted over fifty-two percent of 
the capital’s population, in Philip Morgan, “Black Life in Eighteenth-Century Charleston,” 
Perspectives in American History (1984); 188; Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full o f Money:’ The Self- 
Fashioning o f the Eighteenth Century South Carolina Elite,” 218.
7
The euphoria in Charleston following the repeal of the Stamp 
Act quickly devolved into a period of crisis for the laboring classes. By 
1765, an acute shortage of paper currency and widespread freezing of 
credit brought financial hardship on the majority of Charleston's 
mechanics -  the propertied small storekeepers and artisans -  trickling 
down to those below.12 As wealthy merchants demanded the 
repayment of loans, the "industrious" classes of Charleston lamented 
that a "Man, who does not earn more than Thirty or Forty Shillings in 
the Day (and few do that) cannot possibly pay House-Rent, Cloath and 
feed his family."13 Amid these dire economic straights, the South 
Carolina Gazette published the first news of the Townshend Revenue 
Acts, legislation designed to raise funds by imposing duties on all 
glass, lead, paint, paper, and tea imported into America -  goods 
central to the daily income of Charleston's small businessmen.
12 For many mechanics, including most future Son’s o f Liberty, the 1760s proved a time o f debt. 
Hard times, as historian Richard Walsh illustrates, touched the most important members o f the 
mechanic’s interest, the most radical segment o f Charleston’s propertied political participants. 
Tunis Tebout, for example, remained constantly in debt between 1766 and 1770, owing about 
£4,479 to various merchants, forcing him to curtail his operations, dissolve partnerships, and sell 
his slaves, coastal schooner, and his “boat negroes.” A fellow mechanic and Liberty Tree regular, 
Benjamin Hawes similarly owed more than £2,260, and found himself completely insolvent by 
1770, when the Fellowship Society ofCharleston offered him financial aid. From TheSouth 
Carolina Gazette, October 13, 1767, May 2, 1768, October 5, 1769, May 30,1769; Miscellaneous 
Court Records, 1770-1771, 98 -100, 110,264, 338, 374,392-393; Records o f the Court o f  
Common Pleas, 1767,135,178, 211, 212,272-274,393-396; Minute Book o f the Fellowship 
Society, 1769-1779; Converse D. Clowse, Measuring Charleston’s Overseas Commerce, 1717- 1767: 
Statisticsfrom the Port’s Naval hist (Washington, D. C.: University Press o f America), 1982, 157. 
Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty: A. Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University 
o f South Carolina Press 1968), 43.
13 The South Carolina Gazette, February 2, 1765; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 43.
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In June 1767, the initial reports of Townshend filtered from 
ships into South Carolina's newspapers, reporting in addition to a new 
round of duties, measures to create a Board of Customs 
Commissioners for enforcement. By empowering the collection 
alongside enumerating novel taxes, Parliament made clear its intention 
that revenue was to be extracted from the American colonies, by force 
if necessary. For Charleston's mechanics, like painters George Flagg 
and Benjamin Hawes, these new duties threatened to double the cost 
of their business by raising the price of painter's colors and white lead. 
Stationers, lawyers, and printers faced a levy on the paper vital to their 
trades; cabinet makers, builders, and glazers faced new duties raising 
the cost of glass central to construction.14 For South Carolina's 
planters, who borrowed money extensively to grow cash crops and 
purchase slaves, the renewed duties threatened to drain all hard 
currency from the colony. Planters and mechanics -  who owed money 
to merchants in Charleston and London -  increasingly found 
themselves unable to pay off their debts. With foreclosure rates and 
bankruptcies rising, the future appeared increasingly uncertain.
Rumors spread, as well, of the Townshend Revenue Act 
bolstering the powers of American courts to aid customs officers in the 
enforcement of laws. The seizure of a pair of coastal schooners
14 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 44; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 113.
9
belonging to Henry Laurens -  a prominent citizen, merchant, and (at 
the time) politically moderate member of the Commons House -  
followed by a public trial and vitriolic countersuits, confirmed 
Charleston residents' worst suspicions.15 Actions by imperial officials 
struck fear into sailors, captains, and merchants alike -  around the 
port, customs officials became as dirty a word as 'impressment.' In a 
widely circulated series of pamphlets about his experience and public 
trial, Laurens boldly warned that "such officers" and juryless courts 
were "most likely.. .to effect a disunion between the Mother Country 
and her American offspring," a bold statement among Charleston's 
elites.16
The use of the new duties for "new commissioners of the 
customs" particularly irritated many Charleston residents -  who, in 
alignment with radical Whig thought -  viewed the officials as mere 
"placemen, parasitical and novel ministerial" officers, abusing their 
powers by unnecessarily meddling with coastal trade and "sweat[ing]" 
money from honest businessmen "under the color of law."17 Indeed, 
in an infamous tale, Henry Laurens was apparently so incensed by
15 Prior to efforts o f imperial regulation, customs officials did not interfere with coastal trade -  a 
trade which was vital to transporting cash crops to market, even as
16 Henry Laurens, “Extracts from the Proceedings o f the Court o f  Vice-Admiralty” in Phillip M. 
Hamer, ed., The Papers of Henry Taurens (Columbia: The University o f South Carolina Press, 1968), 
273-79,283-84; Robert M. Weir, “The Scandalous History of Sir Egerton Leigh,” The William and 
Maty Quarterly 3.26 (January 1969): 53.
17 Public Records o f South Carolina MSS, XXXII, 56, hereafter cited as P.R.S.C.; Sellers.
Chariest on Busin ess on the Eve of the American Revolution, 204.
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their actions and "extortions" that upon spotting the offending 
customs official on Charleston's busy street, he barated the gentleman 
and twisted his nose. Word of the incident between a representative of 
the crown and one of the colony's most respected businessmen quickly 
spread throughout the colony. For the mechanics and planters directly 
affected, a widespread conspiracy against Charleston residents' liberty 
and rights as Englishmen appeared afoot. The solution was clear: the 
offending legislation must be resisted and repealed. As during the 
Stamp Act Crisis -  a mere three summers earlier -  Charleston must 
again resume non-importation.18
Response to the Townshend Revenue Acts -  Inaction 
By November 1767, reports of the northern protest movement 
filtered into South Carolina's three major newspapers.19 Non­
importation associations formed in Boston, then spread to ports 
throughout the North. Charleston, however, stayed aloof to calls for 
cooperation. For over a year -  even as John Dickinson's incendiary 
pro-non-importation "Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer" appeared 
in Charleston's newspapers alongside local writers warning that a 
"most imminent danger threatens" our liberty -  the port ignored the
18 Sellers. Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution, 203; Carol Lynn Knight. The 
American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 — 1770: A  Study in Political Imagery. (Lewiston: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990),77.
19 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 — 1770. 119 — 124.
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growing movement of non-importation elsewhere.20 Despite
exuberant toasts to liberty and celebrations of English patriots that 
followed the repeal of the Stamp Act, the booming port city appeared 
unwilling to resume a regime of "strict OECONOMY" in response to 
the Townshend Revenue Acts.21 Continued inaction in Charleston 
came not from a consensus of the majority, but the power of the 
merchant minority. For over a year, letters from Boston merchants to 
their Charleston peers urging cooperation and resistance "were 
handed from man to man," Lieutenant Governor William Bull Jr. 
reported to London, with "silent Neglect."22
Charleston's economic success depended upon the daily 
movement of sailors and slaves in and out of the port. For reasons of 
profit and potential unrest, Charleston's merchant interest deeply 
feared any disruption to this status quo. Recalling the tumult in the
20 Charleston’s newspapers also contained information and updates from London about 
machinations in Parliament. “I fear little will be done for America the next session” reported one 
letter, “ for the Common will not be settled til late in the season.” But also included information 
about changes in the ministry, including changes due ID the ministers’ ill health and possible 
deaths. The South Carolina and America General Gazette, November 13, 1767, November 20, 1767; 
The South C arodnaG a le tte ,T )tc tvcb tt\A ,1767, March 14,1768, April 25, 1768, September 16,
1768, September 23,1768, October 11, 1768; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal\ 
January 5, 1768; Knight The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766— 1770. 89, 94 — 
96.
21 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
22 Boston adopted a non-importation agreement in October 1767, and most o f  the northern 
colonies soon followed. February 1768, Massachusetts sent the circular letter challenging the 
constitutionality o f the Townshend Acts and asking for cooperation among the colonies in 
securing their repeal. Throughout the colonies, petitions were drawn in response and forwarded 
by assemblies to colonial agents in London to be presented to the King. Events beyond the 
Townshend Acts themselves, such as their seizure of John Hancock’s sloop Liberty and the 
quartering controversy in Boston and N ew  York also hastened pressure for action. P.R.S.C. 
(British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56; Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the Aon eric an 
Revolution. (New York Amo Press, 1970), 204.
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streets during the Stamp Act Crisis, Charleston's merchant interest 
proved uninterested in upending the port's stable peace with protest. 
Loathe to exacerbate hostilities between the colonies and Parliament, 
the powerbrokers in Charleston reached a consensus of their own in 
1767 to operate solely within approved channels.23 To limit potential 
risk, the merchants preferred a campaign of direct petitioning in 
London 24 For a growing segment in Charleston, however, after two 
years of waiting it was clear this limited response had failed. Outrage 
against Townshend duties burst from the planters and mechanics 
whose personal incomes were most directly endangered.
Supporters of resuming non-importation -  supporters of direct 
action -  gathered in March 1768 under a large live-oak tree in Mr. 
Mazyck's pasture to celebrate the anniversary of the Stamp Act repeal. 
Mere blocks from the State House, the Liberty Tree served as a 
gathering place "where many loyal, patriotic, and constitutional toasts, 
were drank," often beginning, continuing, and ending with cheers of 
support of John Wilkes. It was under this tree, in the joyous days 
following the Stamp Act repeal that Christopher Gadsden first warned
23 One reason for the apparent lethargy of Charleston merchant was a petitioning campaign 
underway by their agents in Great Britain. Several North American provinces all petitioned for 
repeal, and reports from England indicated that the duties would soon be removed. Agents also 
sent word that Stamp Act-like disturbances would not be smiled upon in London, thus hurting 
chances for a quick repeal o f the offending legislation. The South Carolina Gazette and Country 
Journal, July 25,1769; The South Carolina Gazette July 8, 1769; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 56.
24 For the large export merchants or factors, Parliament appeared to be passing beneficial 
legislation aiding their British parent firms in collecting debts and expanding markets for 
Carolina’s burgeoning rice industry.
13
of the dangers of the Declaratory Act, where mechanics chose 
candidates for office, and where "orderly" assemblies often gathered 
to proceed into town. In the past these crowds had been seen 
"carrying [45] lights...down King street and Broad-street" into a tavern 
"where 45 bowls of punch, 45 bottles of wine, and 92 glasses" 
emerged, and participants spent "a few hours in a new round of 
toasts" celebrating the "Patriots of Britain and America."25
On this occasion, however, "it was observed" reported the South 
Carolina Gazette "that spirits were dampened by the late revenue act." 
The most somber toasts were drunk in honor of Massachusetts and the 
Pennsylvania Farmer with mighty cheers for "Perseverance and 
Success to AMERICAN MANUFACTURES."26 Despite meetings, 
pamphlets, and speeches, the participants -  largely mechanics and 
their sympathizers -  felt little optimism for the resumption of protest 
in Charleston.
The Summer of Our Discontent -  The Renewal of Protest in Charleston 
By early June 1769, a marked change appeared underway in 
Charleston as "a kind of enthusiasm swept the city."27 Writing to his 
superiors in London, Lieutenant Governor Bull rescinded his prior
25 The tree suffered during the Revolutionary War, destroyed by British invading the city. 
Splintered and burned, shards o f the tree were then kept as mementoes, including one of the 
gnarly roots made into a cane for Thomas Jefferson. Description o f Liberty tree and celebrations 
from The South Carolina Gazette, October 3, 1768.
26 The South Carolina Gazette, March 23,1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 46.
27 Wiliam Bull to Earl o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768, PRO, reel 10, vol. 32
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assessment of peace in the port. With their fires stoked by the "most 
determined leaders" acting as "tribunes of the people," an alliance of 
mechanics and planters gathered "in Taverns" and "under the Liberty 
Tree" in opposition to the Townshend Revenue Acts.28 "Loud cries" 
now "silence the weaker voices of moderation" as energetic leaders at 
the vanguard of non-importation effectively rallied Charleston 
residents into "see[ing] how far they could follow the laudable 
example" of New York and Boston.29 These "movers of the grand 
machine" appeared increasingly "obstinate in urging to extremity" 
every "opinion."30
Buried between an obituary for "Mrs. Susannah Bee.. .a Lady of 
so amiable...a Disposition as renders her Death a Loss to Society" and 
an apologetic correction for earlier "MISINFORMATION" reporting a 
"marriage between Benjamin Elliott and Miss Sanders," the South 
Carolina Gazette informed its thorough readers on June 15,1769 that 
"Several Societies of Gentlemen in this Town" had formed in protest. 
Mere weeks after merchants earned praise from imperial ministers for
8 William Bull Jr. described the leaders as “Thomas Lynch who, tho’ a man o f sense is very 
obstinate” in his opinions, Christopher Gadsden “a violent enthusiast in the cause” who 
“maintains with great vehemence the most extravagant claims o f American exemptions,” and 
‘John Mackenzie, whose education at Cambridge ought to have inspired him with more dutiful 
sentiment. P.R.S.C., XXXII, 416; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 48.
29 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, 8, 15, 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons fLiberty, 47-49.
30 William Bull Jr. to Earl o f Hillsborough, October 18,1768, Public Records Office, reel 10 ,vol. 
32; Daniel J. McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens: the Parallel Lives of Two American 
Patriots. (Sellingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2000), 103-4; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of 
Liberty, 47-9; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 5<>57.
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"act[ing] like A WISE AND PRUDENT people" by ignoring non­
importation, the first association since the Stamp Act vowing to 
"purchase no kind of British Goods that can be manufactured in 
America," circulated around Charleston.31 Agreeing to "cloathe 
themselves in homespun as soon as it can be got," this first revive non­
importation association precipitated a tense standoff within the port.32 
The Strategy of Non-Importation 
Response to the challenge of the non-importation association to 
"SIGN or BE RUINED" occurred along lines of economic interest and 
political ideology.33 As a strategy of dissent, signers of the association 
believed that non-importation and non-consumption association could 
gravely injure British commerce effectively awakening British 
merchants -  so "they would see, they would feel, the oppressions we 
groan under, and exert themselves to procure Us redress." Some 
believed that American colonists practicing frugality and supporting 
local manufacturing would unleash "such a disturbance" among 
unemployed Englishmen "at home as would endanger the heads and 
necks" of the authors of the offending laws.34 Additionally, non­
importation offered a peaceful and effective form of protest within
31 The South Carolina Gazette, June 15, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; William 
Henry Drayton, Tetters of Freeman (London, 1771), 1-5.
32 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, July 22,1769.
33 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, July 10, 17, 1769.
34 Maier, From Ted stance to Revolution, 114 -  119; William Henry Drayton, Tetters i f  Freeman 
(London, 1771), 111, 141; Knight, The American Colonial Tress and theTownshend Crisis 95.
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Charleston, by not encouraging anarchy or disorder among the lower 
sorts within Charleston -  non-importation, it was argued, relocated 
dissent from the street to the spinning wheel.
With the export trade in rice and indigo booming, merchants 
continued to feel little concern about the specific Townshend duties. 
Any wholesale price increase could simply be passed to the consumer, 
whereas a renewed boycott necessarily entailed financial risk. 
Additionally, the central benefits of non-importation extolled at length 
in newspapers -  a development of domestic manufacturing, the 
halting of the slave trade, and saving of money through frugality -  
directly threatened the lucrative business of Charleston's merchants.35 
Conversely, planters and mechanics actually benefited from non­
importation schemes because they ensured financial solvency for those 
in debt and lowered prices of goods, while developing new business 
within the port.36 After two years of delay, the first June issue of the 
South Carolina Gazette ushered in a summer where -  at the intersection 
of self-interest and ideology -  a contested protest reemerged in a city 
famous for its harmony.
35 The South Carolina and America General Gazette, November 13, 1767; South Carolina and America 
General Gazette, November 20,1767; South Carolina Gazette, December 14, 1767.
36 The list o f goods proscribed for importation also varied from colony to colony, and in the 
South agreements tended to emphasize non-consumption over non-importation. The South 
Carolina and American General Gazette, September 4, 1767, December 25,1767, January 1, 1768; The 
South Carolina Gazette, October 5,1767; Knight. The American Colonial Tress and theTownshend Crisis
1766 — 1770. 83-4, 92-3, 113; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 115.
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The first non-importation pledges, drafted and signed by the 
mechanics and planters, resulted in a scheme of protest that struck fear 
into the hearts and pocketbooks of Charleston's powerful merchant 
interest.37 Aware that remaining aloof only invited more extreme 
measures, the merchant interest gathered on June 30 at Dillon's tavern 
to discuss their response to the sudden challenge of non-importation.38 
Hoping to reassert the traditional merchant-planter alliance, the 
meeting selected a committee to draft a rival non-importation 
association. On July 7, the merchants "in a Number near eighty" 
presented their scheme "without one differenting voice."39 The South 
Carolina Gazette broadside announced the merchants' association and 
their letter below a reprinting of the first non-importation association 
(including an additional, italicized clause urging unity behind a single 
protest organization) and a preemptive response by "A Mechanic."40 
On a single broadside, Charleston residents faced two contested 
protest associations. In less than a month, the port city that had for two 
years avoided action now possessed two mutually antagonistic 
organizations.
37 The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769.
38 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; July 6, 13, 1769; William Henry Drayton, Tetters of 
Freeman, 1-5; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofEiberty, 47-8; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the 
A. meric an Revolution, 207.
39 The South Carolina Gazette, July 22, 1769; The South Carolina and America General Gazette,July 17, 
1769.
40 By this time, the publisher of The South Carolina Gazette, Peter Timothy, was an ardent 
supporter o f the radical interests, as w illbe examined in the note on sources below.
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The Charleston residents who signed their names to any and all 
of the non-importation associations risked economic loss, potential 
retribution by British authorities, and the constant possibility of 
disorder from the majority population of impoverished sailors and 
slaves. As they read the paper and discussed politics, individuals 
formed opinions of recent events through the lenses of political 
traditions and perceptions of their place in the Empire. In choosing to 
protest -  in weighing the potential of risk versus the possibilities of 
reward -  contemporaries reveal how people oriented themselves 
within the community, colony, and Empire. At an exceptional 
moment, one that challenged individuals to take action (or in the case 
of boycott, inaction), what can we learn by studying this protest? In 
Charleston, the pattern of competition and consensus illustrates a 
contested and contentious balance between the 'interested' propertied 
whites the marginalized parts of the community.
"During the Fortnight past," reported The South Carolina and 
American General Gazette, "several Proposals have been made...for 
stopping the Importation of Goods. ..till the Revenue Acts shall be 
Repealed" with "many" already signing "Resolutions for that 
Purpose."41 Even as merchants and mechanics exchanged bitter
41 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, July 4, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette and 
Country Journal, July 15,1769.
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accusations -  readers learned of several "proposals" underway "for 
One General" agreement.42 Ever fearful of chaos and disorder, a drive 
toward consensus quickly emerged in Charleston. The individuals 
who joined non-importation efforts in Charleston genuinely believed 
in their community's ability to force Parliament to repeal the 
Townshend Revenue Acts through protest, and so the central question 
became deciding upon the most effective, orderly form for that protest.
The drive for consensus stemmed from a common fear that 
mechanics, merchants, and planters shared about the potential actions 
of colonial others -  sailors and slaves -  residing in Charleston. In the 
period of negotiations, mechanics and the planters held "the whip 
hand" as members of the first association increasingly refused to "lay 
out their money" with merchants participating in the second 
association. As lists revealed that a number of merchants belonged to 
both boycott associations, while others supported the position of the 
mechanics and planters, compromise appeared inevitable by mid-July. 
Overtures for a combined agreement by merchants fearing more 
extreme actions resulted in a joint committee to draft a uniform 
agreement distilling the essentials of the two rival agreements.43
42 The South Carolina and American General Gazette. July 17, 1769.
43 S el lers. Charleston B usiness on the Eve of Revo lutio n. 20 8,219.
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On July 22,1769, serving as president of the public meeting 
Christopher Gadsden twice read aloud a new compromised plan, 
pausing paragraph by paragraph to field objections from those 
gathered. By acclaim, the crowd of planters, mechanics, and 
merchants voted "unanimously" to support a third non-importation 
agreement which, reported The South Carolina and American General 
Gazette "we have no reason to doubt will be satisfactory to. ..every 
Freeman in the Province."44 The agreement combined the first and 
second non-importation associations, ultimately granting greater 
allowances for the merchant and planter economic interests, while 
expanding the power of the mechanics.
Unraveling how protest resumed within Charleston requires 
reconstructing this community: tracing the relationships, competition, 
collusion, and ultimate drive for consensus among the 'interested' 
classes who drafted, joined, and participated in non-importation 
schemes shaped by fears of potential unrest among these colonial 
others. The conflict over protest that emerged on June 15 as mechanics 
drafted a non-importation association in direct opposition to the 
merchants' inaction, developed into a brief period with two competing 
organizations, and ultimately ended with an agreement palatable to 
the merchant and planter interests: an agreement that endowed
44 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 49.
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mechanics for the first time with equal political power in the 
association, an extra-legal power they would continue to exercise 
throughout the Revolution.
The rapid transition of Charleston over the summer of 1769 
raises fundamental questions about what participating in these 
associations meant to contemporary people. In all accounts -  
newspapers, correspondence, pamphlets, and journals -  this period 
appears a real crisis within a community "famous for our Harmony." 
In this exceptional moment when different opinions, interests, and 
ideas about protest circulated and divided the community, what can 
we learn about how individuals understood their place within the 
Empire, their persuasive power, and the dynamics of their particular 
community? What self-interest and ideologies drive action? As we 
examine these "interested7 classes, what can we unravel about their 
world and their experience? What can we ascertain about those 
marginalized in this form of protest? How are the interested classes 
pressed into particular actions by the excluded others? In a moment of 
conflict and consensus, answers to these fundamental questions about 
the contemporary experiences of protest challenge us to recreate this 
soon-to-be-Revolutionary world, reexamining common notions about 
the origins of American independence.
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In hindsight, the renewal of non-importation in response to 
Townshend Revenue Acts appears a direct trajectory from the protests 
of the Stamp Act Crisis inexorably pushing towards the Revolution. 
But for Charleston residents in the summer of 1769, the adoption of 
non-importation felt like a wholly distinct moment -  one informed by 
English radical tradition and the community's past experiences -  but 
hardly the torch of an irrepressible revolution severing ties with 
England. So persuaded were those who signed non-importation 
association of their importance within the British empire, that they 
truly believed in their own power to change imperial policy through 
(an often quite limited form of) protest.
This essay examines the origins of the contentious resumption 
of protest in the Charleston during the summer of 1769 to unpack the 
interests, loyalties, perceptions, fears, and hopes driving the initial 
inaction, aggressive articulation, direct competition, and ultimate 
consensus in protesting the Townshend Revenue Acts. Beyond simply 
restoring contingency in the protests prior to the American Revolution, 
by examining this contested moment of protest within Charleston, it is 
possible to reconstruct how contemporaries conceived of their 
moment, their rights, their position, and even themselves within the 
British Empire. While this experience of Charleston does not apply 
everywhere, it certainly begs us to reconsider and reexamine the
23
experience of contemporaries within each port community from Rhode 
Island to Antigua.
The economic interests and ideological divides between the 
merchant, planter, and mechanic interest before the Townshend 
Revenue Acts, deeply influenced the variety of responses to the 
legislation and ultimately shaped what individuals believed they were 
participating in during the resumption of non-importation. Far from 
building a communal trust and common understanding suggested by 
historian T.H. Breen, non-importation in Charleston originated and 
thrived in a contentious, competitive environment.45 Before even 
connecting to other colonies, capturing how the community itself
interacted, points to how protest operated within the British Empire 46
*  *  *
A  Note on Sources - 
The Charleston Press, Public Opinion, and the Townshend Crisis
A  small note appeared on June 1,1769, informing readers of the
South Carolina Gazette that "in Order...to make for the FRESH
INTELLIGENCE" the editor Peter Timothy has "taken the Liberty to
45 T.H. Breen. The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence. New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
46 In reading the contemporary newspapers and letters, it seems nearly impossible to conclude 
that participating in non-importation built trust or developed common understandings. From the 
origins to the enforcement, each individual in Charleston believed they signed on, participated in, 
violated, or resisted fundamentally different associations than others within the community. No 
consensus existed within the port to build towards a common revolution in the manner that T.H. 
Breen or Pauline Maier describe. Choice was part o f the equation, but coercion and marginalizing 
undesirable, radical elements routinely proved more powerful to the outcome of non­
importation.
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leave ou t.. .Advertisements... and the whole of the Marine List."47 In 
Charleston, and throughout the British Empire, colonial newspapers 
provided the central source of printed news and information; during 
times of crisis, the newspaper editors' importance grew exponentially. 
From newspapers, colonists learned of the comings and goings of 
vessels in the port, ministers in Parliament, and British armies in the 
world. While many of the voices of individuals who participated in 
non-importation associations remain lost to the historical record, the 
extant colonial newspapers provide an overview of the news, opinions, 
and political changes which colonists received, read, learned, and 
filtered into their larger understanding of their place in the empire and 
potential to influence Parliament.
Recent work on the colonial press reveals that -  unlike the 
limited distribution of pamphlets -  newspapers circulated widely, 
often passing through multiple hands in roadside taverns and public 
houses.48 In his work on public opinion in colonial America, Richard
47 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1,1769.
48 As a point o f comparison, historians estimate that 195 pamphlets on the question o f American 
independence were published in America between 1764 and mid-1776, but o f  that number, 
merely 16 percent were published between 1767-1772, the height o f theTownshend Revenue 
crisis. Richard Merritt estimates that one newspaper existed for every sixty-five colonists, a 
number he believes rises exponentially once second-hand readers are included. A few o f the 
sources analyzing newspapers and public opinion in the American colonies applied to the 
research for this paper include: Carol Lynn Knight. The American Cohnial Press and the Townshend 
Crisis 1766 — 1770: A  Study in Political Imagery. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 2, 8-9, 
Richard Lawrence Merritt, “Public Opinion in Colonial America: Content-Analyzing The 
Colonial Press,” Public Opinion Quarterly 27 (Fall, 1963), 356-71; Sidney Kobre, Foundations of 
American Journalism (Tallahassee: School o f Journalism, Florida State University, 1958), 81; Sidney 
Kobre, Development of the Colonial Newspaper (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), 160, George E.
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Merritt argues for newspapers as the mouthpiece for the most 
politically relevant stratum of the population, whose changing 
attitudes and perceptions circulated through editorials and letters. 
Contemporaries recognized the impact of newspapers on the 
community for competing interests and individuals used newspapers 
as organs to persuade, cajole, and defend their position.49 Although 
news undoubtedly arrived in ports as rumors and reports from ships, 
the newspapers offer a glimpse into what colonists knew, when they 
knew it, and how they acted upon this knowledge.50
The broadsides of the newspaper -  bracketed with 
advertisements for exotic goods, land for sale, and private tutors -
Cullen, Jr., “Talking to a Whirlwind: The Loyalist Printers in America, 1763-1783” (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University, 1979); Isaiah Thomas, History of Printing in America 
(Barre, Mass: Reprint, 1970), Richard Beale Davis, Intellectual Life in the Colonial South 3 Vols. 
(Knoxville: The University o f Tennessee Press, 1978); and Douglas C. McMurtrie, A  Histoy of 
Printingin the United States Vol. 2, Middle and South Atlantic States (New Y ork: Burt Franklin, 1936). 
Philip G. Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1941); Arthur M. Schlesinger, St., Prelude to Indtpendence: The Newspaper War 
on Britain, 1764- 1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); Jim Allee Hart, The Developing VIEW S  
O N  THE N EW S Editorial Syndrome, 1500- 1800 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1970);and Thomas C.Leonard, “News for aRevolution: The Expose in America, 176 8- 1773,” 
Journal cf American History 67 June, 1980), 26-40.
49 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 2; Richard Lawrence Merritt, “Public 
Opinion in Colonial America: Content-Analyzing The Colonial Press,” Public Opinion Quarterly 27 
(Fall, 1963); Sidney Kobre, Foundations of American Journalism (Tallahassee: School o f Journalism, 
Florida State University, 1958), 81; Sidney Kobre, Development cf the Colonial Newspaper (Gloucester, 
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), 160; George E. Cullen, Jr., ‘Talking to a Whirlwind: The Loyalist 
Printers in America, 1763-1783” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University,
1979).
50 The focus for this paper on newspapers is in part a drive to get away from the 
Gadsden/Laurens dichotomy of many works, by broadening the source base. To avoid assuming 
an impending revolution, as a way to recreate the world where this news was read, interpreted, 
and acted upon the paper relies heavily on newspapers. We are missing several key sources that 
informed the news, particularly the conversations on the docks between captains and crews 
coming and going, much o f the correspondence, and also many o f the papers themselves. For the 
purposes o f this paper, these newspaper serve as arbiters o f public opinion, an assumption that 
overlooks many important factors shaping opinion including -  to name a few -  religion and 
churches, as well as, personal conversations and correspondence.
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presented colonial readers with excerpts of news from abroad, lists of 
vessels in and out of Charleston harbor, and various opinion letters. 
The newspaper directly connected its readers with the community and 
the empire cementing economic, political, and social links across the 
Atlantic. This paper uses contemporary newspaper accounts to 
understand the city in which Charleston residents worked, lived, 
played, and protested. The world presented in Charleston's 
newspapers, however, does not capture all of what occured within 
Charleston. As the advertisements for runaway slaves and the 
movement of ships reveal, a good portion of Charleston residents were 
actively marginalized to the borders by those 'interested' classes, a key 
factor informing and shaping the ensuing protest.
As editor, compiler, writer, and producer, the colonial 
newspaper printer played a central role in shaping opinion -  often 
abandoning English standards of impartiality. While many colonial 
printers served apprenticeships in Great Britain and maintained close 
ties with their mentors, newspapermen in the colonies tended to 
position themselves as businessmen. American printers catered the 
news, information, and editorials to the interests and sympathies of 
readers, often while vying for the business of the colonial governments
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and assemblies as postmaster or public printer.51 Three presses -  the 
South Carolina Gazette, the South Carolina and American General Gazette, 
and theSouth Carolina Gazette and Country Journal -  competed to inform 
their readers of the current state of politics and politicians. Their 
papers included possible changes in imperial plans for the American 
colonies, offered a running commentary on imperial policy, as well as, 
news of the efforts of Agents, merchants, and sympathetic ministers 
promoting South Carolina's interests in England.52
Peter Tiothy, printer of the South Carolina Gazette, inherited a 
reputation for impartiality from his father and, upon the father's death, 
his mother who ran the press. Timothy's paper focused upon printing 
all sides of an issue -  generally avoiding editorial essays- and 
reporting (but not commenting) on news items. The Stamp Act crisis, 
however, marked a substantial shift in the politics and policies of the 
Timothy, who as public printer and postmaster, voiced a measured 
opposition to the duty. The South Carolina and American General Gazette, 
printed by Robert Wells, a Scotsman and principle bookseller in the 
Carolinas, competed for readers with the South Carolina Gazette.
Fearful of violating the Stamp Act legislation, Timothy and Wells 
issued a joint statemetiincreasing subscription prices to cover the cost
51 Buel “Freedom o f the Press,” 68-80, Knight The American Colonial Tress and the Townshend Crisis 
3,4,134.
52 Knight. The American ColonialTress and the Townshend Crisis 46, 135; Maier, From Resistance to 
Revolution, xx.
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of the required stamps. As the increased duty and prices proved
untenable, both papers suspended publication until the act was 
repealed. As of November 1,1765 when the Stamp Act took effect, 
Charleston suddenly possessed no published news outlet. In this 
interim, Peter Timothy's brother-in-law and former apprentice,
Charles Crouch launched his own paper, The South Carolina Gazette and 
Country Journal.53 Aided by members of the lower house -  and with 
little personally to lose -  Crouch violated the Stamp Act to publish his 
newspaper.54
As the Townshend Revenue Acts unfolded into crisis, 
Charleston's three colonial papers -  as well as the other seven 
published in the South -  shared a remarkable degree of uniformity in 
news and opinion. Even as Robert Well's South Carolina Weekly Gazette, 
and the subsequent South Carolina and American General Gazette, 
provided the main stream of conservative thought and Peter Timothy's 
South Carolina Gazette increasingly served as the organ for residents
53 Peter Timothy later explained to Benjamin Franklin that the suspension o f his paper had been 
a major mistake, “reducing” him “from the most popular.. .to the most unpopular Man in the 
Province.” That his former radical readers encouraged his former apprentice and relative Charles 
Crouch to launch a new paper in defiance o f the Stamp Act further angered Timothy. Crouch’s 
South Carolina Gazette and CountryJoum<2/  “ imm ediately attracted a large list o f patrons,” according 
to Timothy, which included Henry Laurens and John Lewis Gervais. Three years after the 
suspension, Timothy estimated that he continued to lose money because o f his decision to 
suspend publication. Jeffery A. Smith, “Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial 
Policies o f the South Carolina Gazette, 1732- 17775,” Journal of Southern History 49, no. 4 (November 
1983): 511-26; Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp Act,” New 
EnglandQuarterly 8 (March 1935): 63-82; Edmund and Helen Morgan, Stamp A.ct Crisis, 242;
Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, January 29, 1766, LP  ,5:5434- 35.
54 Knight. The ^American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 11; Weir, “Role of the Newspaper 
Press in Southern Colonies, 107-8; Christopher Gould, “Robert Wells, Colonial Charleston 
Printer,” South Carolina Historical Magazine, 79 (19 7 8), 23-49;
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pressing the resum ption of non-im portation, the contain nearly
identical news stories from England and other colonies.55 Faced with 
competition from the patriot-leaning South Carolina Gazette and Country 
Journal Timothy's radical position strengthened in the period 
following the suspension of printing during the Stamp Act. By the 
passage of the Townshend Revenue Acts, Timothy's paper became "a 
virtual anthology of anti-ministerial literature," according to historian 
Jeffery Smith, often publishing the writings of John Wilkes and John 
Dickinson alongside events in Boston and New York. Even in leaning 
towards the patriot cause, The South Carolina Gazette's reporting and 
practices (such as printing black borders to announce violations of 
American rights and printing the names of violators of non­
importation association), fall in line with the practices of papers 
throughout the South.56
55 The South Carolina Gazette June 1, 22, 1769, Sellers. Charleston Business on the T v e of the A  meric an 
Revolution, 206; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofUberty, 47.
56 Bythe time ofthe revolution, mostpapers had taken a decidedly patriotic position. Indeed, 
only two southern papers prior to the revolution would be labeled Tory’ -  the Georgia Gazette and 
the South Carolina and American General Gazette. However, during the years o f the Townshend 
crisis, it was not necessarily easy or even possible to tell patriot from Tory papers by looking at 
the news and opinions taken from British publications or the news o f events in neighboring 
colonies. The uniformity o f Southern newspapers, according to Knight, did not occur merely 
from shared intellectual tradition and connections with the British press, but from die shortage of 
printers, the close ties between various printers (kinship, apprenticeship and friendship), and the 
frequent reprinting o f news and letters from papers in other colonies. Knight estimates that 
approximately twenty percent o f the material presented in a given colonial paper had previously 
appeared in print in another paper. N ot only did newspapers reprint stories from each other, but 
also from British newspapers and magazines, which were presented as accurate and balanced 
view o f  British opinions. Knight concludes that this uniformity at the time o f the Townshend 
crisis resulted in a similar image ofBritish initiatives, American responses, and British reactions, 
which might “account for the common understandings that Americans came to about issues.” 
This claim is perhaps both overstating the consensus o f people reading the papers and their 
commitment to particular viewpoints. Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis,
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The Stamp Act Crisis inaugurated a wider position advocacy by 
printers that with the arrival of news of the Townshend Revenue Acts 
became central to the resumption of non-importation associations. As 
with the Stamp Act, the colonial newspapers of Charleston reprinted 
excerpts from pamphlets, letters from concerned citizens, news from 
other colonies, as well as, word of possible repeal (and ministerial 
change) in London.57 One question that emerges from reading these 
papers is: how accurate a picture did the colonial newspapers paint for 
their readers? And, how important were the news reports in shaping 
colonial action? With more regular contacts abroad, the merchant 
interest often cautioned against the picture of British politics portrayed 
in the press, printing their private correspondence from England 
which cautioned against protest, in favor of a petition campaign. In 
her study of The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis, Carol
5-11; Daniel J. McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens: The Parallel Lives of Two 
American Patriots. (Sellingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 20(30) 53; Hennig Cohen, The 
South Carolina Gazette (Columbia; University o f South Carolina Press, 1953); James W. Barker, 
“The Coming o f the War for Independence and the South Carolina Press: An Examination o f  
Printer’s attitudes and a Content Assessment o f their Papers, 1765-1770,” (unpublished M. A  
Thesis, the University o f South Carolina, 1980); J. Ralph Randolph, “The End o f Impartiality: 
South Carolina Gayette, 1763- 7 5;” Journalism Quarterly, XLIX (Winter, 1972), 703-06 andJefferyA. 
Smith, “Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial Policies of the South-Carolina Gazette, 
1732-1775,” The Journal cf Southern History, XLIX, No. 4 (Nov., 1983), 511-26; Stephen Botein, 
“Meer Mechanics’ and an Open Press: The Business and Political Strategies o f Colonial American 
Printersf  Perspectives in American History, IX (1975), 127-228; Stephen Botein, “Printers and the 
American Revolution,” in The Press and The American Revolution, ed. By Bernard Bailyn and John B. 
Hench (Worcester. American Antiquarian Society, 1980), 11-58; Richard Buel, Jr., “Freedom of  
the Press in Revolutionary America: The Evolution o f libertarianism, 1760- 1820,” in The Press 
and the American Revolution, edited by Bailyn and Hench, 59-98 and Robert M. Weir, “The Role of 
the Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies on the Eve o f the Revolution: An Interpretation,” 
in The Press and the American Revolution, edited by Bailyn and Hench, 99-150.
57 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis, 4-6,
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Knight finds gross misrepresentation of British opinion in the press, 
often exaggerating both the size and power of the pro-American 
faction and the tolerance for colonial disobedience, key factors in the 
arguments supporting renewed non-importation during the 
Townshend Revenue Act crisis.58
Alongside many in England, Ireland, and the British colonies, 
Charleston residents perceived a wider plot against freedom and 
liberty afoot.59 This paper builds upon the scholarship Pauline Maier 
and neo-Whig historians, but also moves beyond "portents of 
revolution" to examine how a community understood their position, 
without overshadowing their historical moment.60 The Charleston 
residents who participated in non-importation each entered into 
associations with their own distinct ideas of economic self-interest and 
ideology, participated in protest with fellow associators possessing 
diametrically opposite views, and, when they violated the associations, 
illustrated the wide variety of opinions which fell under the umbrella 
of non-importation. As there was no direct trajectory to protest in 
Charleston, there was certainly no direct trajectory from protest to 
revolution. As a historian, then, understanding protest requires
58 Thomas G. Tanselle. “Some Statistics on  American Printing, 1764-1783,” in The Press and the 
American Revolution, ed. Bailyn and Hence, 354.
59 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, xii — xviii.
60 Maier, From Red stance to Revolution, xviii, x-xi,xx, 114; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston Mob and 
the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1675-1784,” Perspectives in 
American History, IV (1970), 171- 96; Edward Countryman A  People in Revolution,
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analyzing how contemporaries in a community understood their 
moment: what were the inputs driving for protest, what were the 
dynamics pressing for consensus, and how did the experience of 
protest match expectations of what they believed they were 
participating in by signing non-importation agreements. In the 
following pages, this paper explores these three questions, beginning 
with an examination of the ideological, political, and economic 
contexts for the 1769 renewal of non-importation and then traces the 
contentious resumption of non-importation during the summer of 
1769.
*  *  *
Chapter 1: Charleston's Perceptions of Position within the Empire—
The Economic and Ideological Contexts for the Townshend Crisis
From the goods that filled their homes to the news that filled 
conversations, colonial Charleston residents consciously and proudly 
defined themselves as British. Hardly a core or periphery, in their 
economic, political, and social lives Charleston's planters, mechanics, 
and merchants felt a vital part of the British Empire. By the summer of 
1769, these feelings of strong attachment and power within the 
economic empire coexisted alongside genuine fears of being 
marginalized by political machinations in London. The resumption of 
non-importation emerged from a web of inputs: including, the 
community's (often heightened) perception of importance within a
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global empire, their confidence in the power to persuade English 
politicians, and their sense that they participated in a larger British 
political conversation. The resumption of protest in Charleston affirms 
that in the British Empire, not all politics was local.61
Perceptions of Power in the Empire -  
The Merchant Community of Charleston
Situated at the convergence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers -  
the meeting point between product (deerskins, rice, indigo, and cotton) 
and market (Europe and the West Indies) -  the port of Charleston 
oversaw upwards of ninety percent of the colony's imports and 
exports throughout the eighteenth century. The city's physical growth 
occurred alongside its commercial development, so that from 1720 to 
the American Revolution, Charleston's population quadrupled to 
become the fourth largest town in colonial America.62 Far from a 
single endeavor or narrowly defined interest, the pursuit of economic 
gain in any possible form defined the multifarious activities of
61 As Russell Menard argues, the roots o f South Carolina’s revolutionary movement grew from 
the fertile economics o f the port, which “made some citizens aggressive and self-confident, filled 
them with pride in their achievements, persuaded them that they could manage their own affairs” 
and “made them resent British interference.” Russell R. Menard, “Economic and Social 
Development o f the South,” in The Cambridge Economic Elistory of the United States, vol. 1, The 
Colonial Era, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman. (Cambirdge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 249-95; Mercantini, Who Shall Rule at Home? 18-19.
62 The professional local merchant community grew with the exportation o f rice. The majority of 
merchants were British, but a number o f Eluguenot migrants and traders from the West Indies. 
U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970,2 
vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 2:1161, 1164; R.C. Nash, The 
Organisation cfTrade andFinance in the A. tlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775 ined. 
Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 200 5), 77; Peter A. Coclanis. 
Shadow of aDream: Economic Fife and Death in the South CarolinaEow Country 1670 — 1920. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 114.
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Charleston's business community. This ethic of aggressive economic 
self-interest thrived in the business climate of the British Empire in the 
period preceding 1763, when minimal government interference or 
enforcement enabled Charleston merchants to effectively centralize 
control of the trade for their surrounding region.63
The export trade in rice -  and later indigo -  out of Charleston 
fell under the control of a specialized merchant community who 
oversaw a sophisticated mortgage exchange spanning the Atlantic 
World. Carolina's economy relied upon a near constant flow of credit 
directed by these colonial merchants who acted as agents or 
representatives for British firms. Commission merchants or merchant 
factors (the term used in this paper, as the most common in sources) 
served the role of importer, exporter, broker, and banker: selling 
merchandise sent to him by his British firm, purchasing goods for his 
British correspondents, arranging shipments, and lending money 
locally for the purchase of land, slaves, and all manner of goods. 
Exports to the West Indies and Southern Europe, as well as to Great
63 For imperial purposes, the “Charleston District7’ comprised o f  South Carolina, swaths of  
North Carolina, Georgia, and after 1763 East and West Florida. The trade from each o f these 
regions flowed primarily through Charleston, and many factors and planters from South Carolina 
developed the products and farms in the surrounding colonies (particularly Georgia). Sellers, 
CharlestonBuisness on the Eve ofFeuolution. x, 4, 8, 31; Nash, The Organisation cf Trade and Finance in the 
Atlantic Exonomy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670— 1775, 96-7.
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Britain, largely occurred on these British rather than South Carolinian 
account books.64
Merchant factors -  the key leaders of the merchant interest in 
the colonial era -  epitomized Charleston's position as a cosmopolitan 
port. In an era when personal contacts enabled the global flow of 
credit key to the cash-crop economy, an individual factor's wealth, 
family connections, and friendships powered Charleston's economy.65
64 A few books and articles on  the economic development o f Charleston informing this paper: 
Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution, George C. Rogers, Charleston in 
the Age of the Pickneys. (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1980); Stuart O. Stumpf, 
“The Merchants o f Colonial Charleston, 1680 —1756” (Ph.D. diss., State University o f Michigan,
1971); Peter A. Coclanis. “The Hydra Head o f Merchant Capital: Markets and Merchants in Eady 
South Carolina,” in The Meaning ofSouth Carolina History: Essays in Honor of George C. Rogers, Jr. ed. 
David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N . Wilson (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Pres, 1991), 1- 
18; R.C.Nash, “Urbanization in the Colonial South: Charieston, South Carolina, as a Case 
Study,” Journal of Urban Histoiy 19 (1992): 3- 29; eds. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute and 
Randy J. Sparks. Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society. 
(Columbia:TheUniversityofSouthCarolina Press, 2001); Russell R. Menard,“Economic and 
Social Development o f the South,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, vol. I, The 
Colonial Era, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman. (Cambirdge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 249-95.
65 In an overview of Charleston factors, it appears the chief requirements were a combination of 
personal capital and an apprenticeship as a clerk with an English or Carolina merchant firm. The 
capital was critical for purchasing merchandise (most notably slaves), providing warehouses 
goods, purchasing partnerships in ships, as well as extending loans. Wealthy and powerful 
families sought positions for their sons in the merchant houses, which meant that planters’ sons 
frequently became merchants. This practice further blurs clear lines of merchant or planter class. 
The training began as a merchant’s clerk, when aspiring factors learned the basics o f shipping and 
supplying credit through the tedious work o f  invoices, backcountry travel and overseeing 
shipping. Clerkships often required young men to travel to the frontier o f the province, to 
plantations, to the West Indies, Southern Europe, and Great Britain, as a way “to establish a 
correspondence with the merchants trading to Carolina & obtain a share o f  their commissions.” 
In an economy that necessitated personal trust, this period proved key to cementing future 
business. Future factor John Hopton, for example, toured over 500 miles o f  the frontier country 
to gain trading partners, followed by foreign travels during his five-year clerkship with Henry 
Laurens. This preparation, Laurens wrote, would allow Hopton to begin “commercial life upon 
as good footing as any man he had known in Carolina.” In the transition from clerkship into 
business, Hopton received the assistance o f two established Charleston factors, Laurens and 
Gabriel Manigault who invested together in a cargo of rice, sending with Hopton a 
recommendation letter “to give him an introduction into trade and assist him in making West 
Indian correspondents,” and guaranteeing any loans. Much like Charleston society, this business 
arrangement relied personal connections in a way almost unimaginable today. Laurens’ 
correspondence in regards to Horton can be found: Laurens to Mayne & co. Aug. 1 ,1770; to 
Cowles & Co., Feb. 18,1771; to R. Grubb, March 6, 1771; to Bright & Co., Jan. 12, 1770; a good
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With no thought to a separation between colony and metropole, 
individuals born in Great Britain traded in Charleston and Charleston 
natives traded in London. With regular contacts in Liverpool, London, 
Oxford, Bristol, Cowes, Poole, Glasgow, Jamaica, Barbados, New 
Providence, Tortola, St. Christopher, St. Kitts, Antigua, St. Augustine, 
Oporto, Lisbon, Madrid, Havana, Guadeloupe, Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia, and Rotterdam, Charleston factor Henry Laurens, for 
example, possessed a network of trading partners eager for a part of 
the lucrative rice and indigo trade. For some factors, like Samuel 
Wragg and Scott James Crokatt, trading and living in Charleston 
proved but a brief sojourn before establishing firms in London.66 
British firms not only traded in Charleston, but London merchants also 
served as agents representing the colony, actively petitioning 
Parliament and ministers on behalf of Charleston's merchant interest. 
Through personal contacts throughout the Atlantic basin, Charleston's
overview of this process is in: Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 49 - 51; Nash, The 
Organisation of Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775, 95.
66 Trade connects were so numerous that, at the end o f the Revolutionary War, five London 
firms founded byChadeston expatriates claimed sixty-three percent o f the prerevolutionary debt 
owed from South Carolina to London merchants. In this continuing theme of the importance o f  
personal connections, Wragg’s position in London was replaced byjames Crokatt who in the 
1720s and 30s, had been one o f Charleston’s key merchants before moving to London in 1737, 
where he acted as South Carolina’s agent. Factor John Beswicke followed a similar path, 
migrating to Charleston from London around 1734, to return to London in 1747 a major trader, 
operating a firm only second to Crokatt’s. While personal experience in the colony certainly 
helped business, a number o f London merchants traded exclusively with Charleston interests but 
had never lived or visited. These merchants often possessed, however, close family and business 
ties with those who had migrated, and remained in regular communication. One example, John 
Nutt, a leading London merchant, married James Crokatt’s daughter and worked with his 
brother, Joseph, who represented his firm’s business interests in South Carolina. Nash, The 
Organisation cf Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775, 92-5.
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powerful merchants kept their fingers on the pulse of the Empire. 
Hardly some parent-child metaphor -  a myriad of real personal, 
financial, and political connections spanned the Atlantic intimately 
connecting port city to imperial capital.
As part of orchestrating export shipping and delivery, the 
Charleston factor also served as wholesale importers competing 
directly with a growing number of independent merchants in the 
port.67 Between 1732 to 1737, seventy-four traders advertised the sale 
of dry and miscellaneous goods in Charleston, importing from Britain 
an average of £ 84,000 per year. Thirty years later, the number of 
advertisers reached 130 with imports increasing to over £ 271,000 per 
annum. These independent merchants -  often referred to as Country 
factors -  grew in number throughout the late colonial period, operating 
retail stores in Charleston and placing direct orders for their planter 
clientele.68 The profusion of local merchants, left "our place...saturated 
with every Article of Merchandize by Merchants who im port.. .upon 
their Accounts," complained factor Henry Laurens to a Bristol 
correspondent, so that "there is very seldom an Opportunity of 
making even a saving Sale of Goods."69 Imported goods inundated
67 Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 50, 53.
68 Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the A.tlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670- 
1775,82-83.
69 As Henry Laurens wrote to a Bristol merchant in October 1768; Sellers, Charleston Business on the 
Eve cf Revolution, 50, 53.
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Charleston's market, as independent importers expanded their 
business through credit from British firms. This rapid growth of a 
second type of merchant created a major fault line within the merchant 
interest.
Country factors -  like their planter customers -  hoped for high 
prices for rice, low freight weights, and continual extensions of credit. 
As the orchestrators of shipping exports abroad, merchant factors, 
conversely, profited from the combination of low rice prices and high 
freight rates. Each of the two sides -  that representing rice grower 
(country factor) and rice purchaser (merchant factor) -  competed to 
create a profitable business climate. This jockeying for profits, by 
limiting the amount of rice in Charleston, flooding the market during a 
full harbor, and spreading disinformation, pitted the country factors 
and planters against the merchant factors.70 This divide between 
merchants with antithetical business interests emerged alongside a 
period of changing imperial regulation, substantially undergirding the 
tensions, perceptions, and responses to Parliamentary legislation.
Confidence and the Currency Crisis -
Conflicting Perceptions of Charleston's Place within the Empire
From its beginnings as a disease-ridden hinterland, a quest for 
maximum profit and participation in global trade motivated South
70 Nash, The Organisation ofTrade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670- 
1775,80.
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Carolina's planters and merchants. Through various bounties, 
Parliament and the Assembly of South Carolina promoted market- 
oriented crops including: indigo, flax, hemp, tobacco, silk, wine, 
lumber, naval stores, olive oil, barley, wheat, cotton, and ginger.71 
Eager to exploit these opportunities, Charleston's early entrepreneurs 
combined planting with trade, establishing a pattern that continued 
throughout the colonial era. The success of rice laid the foundation for 
Charleston's heightened perception of its own importance within the 
British Empire. With a rising slave population in the West Indies,
South Carolina's planters and merchants exported the cheap foodstuffs 
that fueled the lucrative sugar industry. With naturally overlapping 
and intertwining interests, South Carolina's merchants and planters 
allied together for maximum gain, enjoying enormous profits even as 
northern ports suffered economic depression.72
For Charleston residents, rice exports not only rebuilt the city in 
fine English style but, more importantly, cemented their elite status 
within the Empire. In response to petitions from colonial agents and 
London firms, Carolina rice traders won a rare exception to the 
Navigation Acts in 1730, enabling their ships to travel directly into 
regions south of Cape Finisterre without first passing through British
71 P.R.S.C .XXXII, 31; Sellers, Charleston Buisness on the Eve of Revolution. 31.
72 Hardy, “Colonial South Carolina’s Rice Industry and the Atlantic Economy,” in eds. Greene. 
Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society, 117.
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ports. Not only did this exception radically increase profits for the 
planters, merchants, and investors in Carolina's rice, it bolstered a 
feeling of importance for the port. Charleston business -  it seemed to 
those most closely involved -  was so crucial to the Empire as to merit 
enumeration, advancement, and protection from the highest levels of 
British government.73 In the decades following the 1730 exception, 
Charleston residents possessed ample justification to look around the 
Atlantic World and feel like a central, powerful player in the web of 
empire.
Throughout the 1740s and 1750s, investment in the fast-growing 
plantation economy of South Carolina proved lucrative business; in 
England, investments returned at most five percent, while investments 
in South Carolina commonly resulted in an eight to twelve percent 
gain.74 Eager investors lent money to planters and merchant houses 
created complex systems of indirect investments in the form of 
mortgages on slaves and land. The Charleston merchant factor not 
only provided the link between investor and investment, but also often 
directly invested in land, slaves, and plantations himself.75 The 
cheapness of land, the possibility of reward, and the initial cost of
73 Hardy, “Colonial South Carolina’s Rice Industry and the Atlantic Economy,” in eds. Greene. 
Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society, 115-7; Nash, The 
Organisation of Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Econo my: Britain and South Carolina, 1670— 1775, 87.
74 Nash, The Organisation ofTrade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy'.Britain and South Carolina, 1670 
-  1775, 95; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 53, 55, 74-75.
75 Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 57-59.
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investment prompted innumerate co-partnerships between merchants 
and planters to form, dissolve, and reappear. Such diversification in 
agricultural product, as historian R.C. Nash points out, "was not a 
symptom of entrepreneurial backwardness," but a "rational 
investment" in a highly profitable global commodity. The availability 
of short and long-term credit became increasingly important 
throughout the colonial period, and left Charleston planters and 
merchants heavily in debt to London merchants.76
In the period following the Seven Years War, colonial planters 
and merchants discovered English capital progressively more difficult 
to access. A change appeared underway, challenging Charleston's 
self-perception as a co-equal player in the British Empire. As flow of 
easy credit and ready investment slowed, the fundamental pattern of 
colonial business shifted. The passage of both the Restraining Act and 
Currency Act in 1764 dealt Charleston a further blow by forbidding the 
emission of legal tender currency without the permission of Parliament 
and effectively preventing the use of paper bills of credit as legal 
tender, a common practice within the port city.77
76 Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670 
-  1775; 90, 97. *
77 Parliament gravely threatened colonial financial structures by passing in September 1764 “an 
act to prevent the issue o f paper bills o f credit in any o f the colonies and to prohibit the legal 
tender o f such bills, as were then subsisting, from being prolonged beyond the periods for calling 
in and sinking them ” Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 41; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of 
Revolution, 68, 72; 4th George III, Cap. X XXIV; McDonough, Christopher Gadsden andHenry 
Laurens, 64.
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The 'currency question' dominated discussions within the port 
as paper money became increasingly scarce, a reality that particularly 
dogged artisans, small merchants, and planters who often found 
themselves without recourse when repaying debts to merchant 
factors.78 Planters chafed under the operation of the law, finding 
themselves without sufficient funds to pay past debts -  often unable to 
buy goods and services from mechanics or merchants. Similarly as 
fewer and fewer employers could pay wages, mechanics increasingly 
resorted to bartering. The Charleston court docket filled with cases of 
debts, and the newspapers advertised daily demands to settle 
accounts.79 Tensions between the merchant, mechanic, and planter 
interest groups rose, with numerous societies forming to demand 
relief.
Parliamentary acts to raise revenue (e.g. Sugar, Stamp and 
Townshend Revenue Acts) threatened to further remove legal tender 
from the colony.80 When combined with strict customs enforcement 
and the news from other colonies -  Jack Green and Richard Jellison
78 McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry L^ aurens. 68-9.
79 Records o f the Court o f Common Pleas, 1767. Miscellaneous Court Records, 1770-1771, Book 
DD, MS, typewritten copies, South Caroliniana Library; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofEiberty, 41-42
80 The Sugar Act, as it was usually called, did not prohibit the exportation o f provisions and 
lumber (the chief American exports) to the French West Indies. It did place such a high duty on 
the importation o f foreign sugars that this vital trade became almost useless for American who 
wanted to accumulate credits so that they could buy British manufactured goods. Squeezed 
between rising prices for imports and the falling prices o f exports, Americans trading with the 
West Indies were outraged at a tax that cut further into their profits. In New York, John Watts 
commented crisply and darkly, “the weak must go to the wall.” Alan Rogers, Empire and Elberty: 
American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1974), 
125; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Eiberty, 33.
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have argued -  the currency crisis served as a reminder to the colonists
that despite their trading position, they remained subordinate to the 
desires of the imperial government.81 Fearful contemporaries 
measured the effect of Parliamentary actions by Charleston's most 
visible bottom line: the harbor, for as one Charleston resident 
estimated, "soon" ships would be "out of employ: And their burthen 
together...reckoned 3,500 tons."82 In their petition opposing the Stamp 
Act, the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly expressed great 
concern that the "state of the paper currency in use in the province" 
had dipped dangerously low with merely £106,500 in currency (equal 
to £15,214 sterling) circulating. The colonial government urged their 
agent Charles Garth to "use your utmost endeavors to procure for this 
province liberty to emit paper currency to the amount of £40,000 
sterling," a request that was repeatedly denied.83 The announcement of
81 Henry Laurens to Cowles and Harford, May 5, 1764, TjP, 4:264-65; Knight. The American 
Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 45; Jack Greene and Richard M. Jellison, “Currency Act of 
1764 in Imperial-Colonial Relations, 1764- 1776,” William an dMaiy Quarterly ,3 rd Ser. Vol. 18 
(Oct., 1961), 490.
82 Expressions o f anxiety by American merchants cannot be dismissed as simply reactions to a 
temporary post-war slump. In fact, economic difficulties in the 1760s were caused by 
fundamental structural changes in the Atlantic economy that had been accelerated by the Seven 
Years War. Specifically, during the war British firms had extended their business operations so 
widely that by 1763 they were bypassing established American importers andretailers. Together 
with the effort by British merchants to reduce the American share o f trans-Atlantic shipping, the 
postwar depression can be seen as a direct challenge to American economic sovereignty. Rogers, 
Empire andUbertj, 127; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve ofPevolution, 63; The South Carolina 
Gazette, June 27, 1768.
83 While the Currency Act o f 1764 was largely ignored in the year of its passage for the Stamp 
Act, by 1769, it was causing major problems within the colonies. The Currency crisis was made 
worse by the raising of taxes within South Carolina and Chadeston during the same period. 
Between 1750s and 1770s, the population o f Charleston nearly doubled, an increase accompanied 
by an increase in the numbers o f poor. Requests for relief from churchwardens o f St Philip’s 
rose thirty percent, while taxes increased almost 700 percent between 1751 — 1773. P.R.S.C.
44
"novel" taxation schemes in "these times of necessity" as Henry 
Laurens wrote, "when money is scarcer than ever" caused legitimate 
panic in Charleston.84
Government and South Carolina:
Imperial Dimensions of Local Politics
Grumblings about the state of colonial currency filled the ornate 
lobby of the new State House. Since the assumption of royal 
government in the colony to the present disruptions, the South 
Carolina Commons House of Assembly had developed into the 
dominant force in colonial governance. Modeled on the English ideal, 
the South Carolina government included a democratically elected 
lower house, a crown appointed executive, and a 12-member Council 
or Upper House.85 In theory, each part worked harmoniously to 
govern the colony, but in reality, a "bitter, persistent strife"
XXXI, 278 — 27 9; Sellers Charleston Business on the Eve ofRevolution, 72; Henry Laurens To 
Reynolds Getly & Co. CP, Sept. 20, 1770; McDonough. Christopher G adsden and Henry Laurens. 64; 
Committee o f Correspondence to Charles Garth, September 4, 1764, as quoted in R.W. Gibbes, 
Documentary History of the American Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1855), 1:2-3; 
Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Toumshend Crisis. 45.
84 Example o f  taxation: the tax Act o f 1760 required payment of35 shillings oneach slave, 17 
shillings 6 pence per centum on the value o f town lots, wharves, and buildings. They were also 
assessed 17 shillings 6 pence per hundred pounds on every note bearing interest “over and above 
what they pay interest for,” 5% on all annuities, and 17 shillings 6 pence per hundred pounds on 
the profits o f all the professions. Reductions in subsequent tax acts were negligible so that during 
the years between 1760 and 176 5 Carolinians paidmore in taxes than ever before. Walsh. 
Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 33-34.
85 On elite domination o f Carolina’s government, o f the 156 merchants elected to the South 
Carolina House o f Representatives, approximately ninety percent owned plantations. O f the self­
described “merchant-planters” elected to the House, 81 percent were merchants before 
becoming planters, while only eleven percent began as planters. This information was compiled 
from Water B. Edgar and N. Louise Bailey’s directory o f the South Carolina House of 
Representatives, which shows that o f 156 merchants elected from 1692 -  1775, at least 119 
(nearly 90 percent) owned plantations, in Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the Atlantic 
Fconomy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670 — 1775, 95.
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characterized the colonial government. South Carolina's political 
history brims with instances of interest group politics dominating the 
Assembly's proceedings and long standing conflicts between the 
Assembly and royal governors regularly breaking into open conflict.86 
The design provided the Assembly with a central voice in local 
governance, but empowered the royal governor as the sole 
representative of South Carolina to British imperial authorities. The 
imperial crisis of the 1760s derived much of its shape and rhetoric from 
this contested political history.
The Commons House of Assembly tipped the precarious 
balance of powers between local governance and imperial policy in 
their favor during the period of relatively lax oversight from 1722 to 
1748. As the Board of Trade remained aloof from local governance, the 
Assembly largely ignored the royal governors and treated royal 
instructions as recommendations rather than imperatives.87 When
86 In A  Schoolfor Politics: Commercial lobbying and Political Culture in Early South Carolina, Rebecca 
Starr argues that merchants rather than planters dominated South Carolina’s political culture 
(by holding more leadership positions and leading the majority o f the day-to-day business of  
governing, because o f residence in Charleston). She argues that interest group politics became 
the norm, and tended to encourage/demand consensus and internal conflict resolution, 
essentially accounting for Charleston’s famous “harmony.” Starr argues, counter to Jonathan 
Mercantini (presses for South Carolinians as surprisingly aggressive in their determination for 
independence), that South Carolinians were reluctant revolutionaries. Their debate overlooks 
contest to focus on this question o f consensus, and both accounts appear more interested in 
uncovering the roots o f South Carolina’s role in the antebellum era in colonial political 
development. This trend to locate the origins o f the nullification crisis and secession in the 
Revolutionary era reappears throughout numerous, otherwise balanced works, often skewing 
towards a teleological argument. Rebecca Starr, A  Schoolfor Politics: Commercial Lobbying and Political 
Culture in Early South Carolina. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Mercantini,
Who Should Rule at Home? 4, 6,18.
87 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 5-10.
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local interests conflicted with London's legal prerogatives, royal 
officials in South Carolina found implementation impossible.88 
Colonial representatives defended their local authority as fundamental 
to their "rights as Englishmen," establishing a pattern that would 
reappear at any sign of controversy.
Throughout the colonial period, the Commons House -  
dominated by Charleston's elite merchants and planters -  proved 
enormously successful in exercising control over finances, and thereby 
influencing executive appointments and affairs. Even when, after a 
protracted struggle, the royal governor finally gained a permanent 
salary, the Assembly retained the ultimate trump card. In moments of 
conflict, the Assembly could refuse to pass tax bills, effectively leaving 
the government without operating funds -  a move which inevitably 
wrung concessions from the governor.89
From a series of conflicts over Indian, military, election, and 
backcountry affairs, the Commons House of Assembly in Charleston 
won and exercised powers beyond those of the Hose of Commons in
88 There was nothing novel about the manner o f resistance; the courts, the lower houses of  
representatives, crowds protesting in the streets, were -  by 1765 -  familiar parts o f American 
politics Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 5-6; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 128.
89 The struggle between the assemblies and royal governors for control o f the southern colonies 
is well explained by Jack P. Greene in The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the 
Southern Royal Colonies, 1689- 1776 (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina press, 1963). Green 
has also provided the authoritative account o f the Gadsden election controversy in his article, 
‘T h e Gadsden Election Controversy and the Revolutionary Movement in South Carolina,” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 46, no. 3 (December 1959): 469-92; McDonough, Gadsden and 
Laurens, 47
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England. Attempts at imperial regulation following the Seven Years 
War, met a Commons House in Charleston that refused to divest its 
powerful control on South Carolina's politics.90 By 1763, as historian 
John Mercantini illustrates, the rights of local control over elections, 
finances, representation, taxation and Indian affairs which South 
Carolinians claimed as their English birthrights, "diverged in 
important ways from traditional English rights."91
Despite their dominance within the colony's government, the 
formal structures of empire favored the royal governor as the "King's 
man" in South Carolina. While the Commons House retained an agent 
to lobby in Parliament and powerful Charleston merchants and 
planters maintained numerous connections in London, the governor 
possessed direct access to policy makers. After the Seven Years War, 
when Parliament sought to rationalize the empire and bolster home 
authority, an election controversy involving Christopher Gadsden and 
royal governor Thomas Boone resulted in the dissolution of the 
legislature -  who had withheld Boone's salary and resolved to pass no 
law until he formally apologized. The contest ended when Boone left
90 The issues underlying and the justifications for protest built upon older frameworks. Tensions 
with GovernorThomas Boone reached a climax when, in 1762, the governor refused to allow 
Christopher Gadsden to take his seat in the South Carolina assembly. The Cherokee and Seven 
Years’War gave rise to older problems -  ranging from quartering troops, impressment, to raising 
o f  revenue -  that coupled with the development o f the lower house o f assembly as the center o f  
political power exacerbated post-war efforts at imperial regulation. Mercantini, Who Should Rule at 
Home? 10; Roger s, Empire and Liberty, 128-9; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens, 
1 1 - 1 2 .
91 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 10.
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the colony in 1764, but served only to heighten tensions and spread 
fears of a plot against liberty at a critical juncture in local and imperial 
politics.92
Participation in an Atlantic Political Conversation- 
Imperial Regularization and Charleston's Reaction
The attempts to regularize the British Empire following the 
Seven Year's War, met an elite in Charleston who were convinced from 
nearly four decades experience of their centrality within the trading 
empire, who believed that they exemplified British ideals, and who 
were convinced that they could and did influence policy at the highest 
levels. That Charleston's interested parties understood their position 
this way powerfully shaped their reactions to the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Newspapers reported stories of political contests in Charleston using 
the same radical Whig ideology applied to contests in England (i.e. the 
on-going John Wilkes saga) cementing a sense in the port that even in 
the smallest -  most seemingly picayune -  disputes, Charleston 
residents participated in a wider conversation defending traditional 
British rights.
Decades of political contest within the colony left Charleston's 
governing planter and merchant elite with a clear sense of their 
prerogatives within the empire, but importantly their power to
92 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 22.
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persuade both their community and imperial ministers, often through 
measured resistance. Protest, ultimately derives from a belief in one's 
power to persuade others to act. This belief served as the backdrop for 
the announcement of the Stamp Act in Charleston.
Facing an unprecedented national debt and increased costs of 
defense in America imperial policymakers felt the expense of 
maintaining an empire should necessarily fall upon South Carolina 
and fellow American colonies.93 Predicting resistance, policymakers in 
London searched for suitable methods to raise revenue, ultimately 
settling upon extending the stamp duty to America. Since the reign of 
Charles II, stamp duties (which placed taxes of varying amounts on 
such items as legal documents, newspaper advertisements, and 
playing cards) had been commonplace in England as an effective and 
inexpensive tax to collect.94
As the Stamp Act awaited Parliamentary action, the South 
Carolina Commons House of Assembly again voiced their opposition 
through their colonial agent Charles Garth. The measure, wrote the
93 With the annual cost o f the army estimated at nearly £220,000, Prime Minister Grenville 
believed it reasonable that America should assume part o f the expense. Previously, Grenville had 
rejected relying upon the traditional methods o f requisition — demanding revenue from the 
colonial assemblies, or the customs service — as inadequate. It was estimated at the time that the 
British debt per person was eighteen pounds in 1763, whereas America it was only 18 shillings. 
McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 62
94 P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp A d  Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 32; 
John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943), 
208-10.; Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp A d  Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), 36; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 
62; Thomas C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660- 1775 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 102-4.
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leading opponent in the Commons House Christopher Gadsden, 
subverted "that inherent right of every British subject, not to be taxed 
but by his own consent, or that of his representative."95 Reporting the 
latest developments in London, Charles Garth informed the Assembly 
that Parliament would tolerate no such arguments about the 
legitimacy of such a tax, nor any claims to the colony's inability to pay 
hard currency.
Colonial agent Charles Garth further encouraged South 
Carolina's governing elite to appreciate the precedent established by 
the Stamp Act: that in the future, Parliament would consult with the 
colonies prior to the passage of any revenue legislation affecting 
America. Within the context of a currency crisis, the Commons House 
of Assembly simply could not perceive this as a victory; the actions of 
Parliament appeared -  if not an outright conspiracy -  a clear sign of 
declension from the exalted position Charleston held within the 
Imperial order. Although the physical stamps never arrived in 
Charleston, their mere existence challenged the fundamental 
assumptions held by Charleston's interested classes about to their
95 Charles Garth consistently counseled the assembly and citizens in Charleston that it would be 
wise to follow the Stamp Act, given that it established the constitutional precedent requiring that 
Parliament consult the colonies prior to the passage of the revenue legislation. Morgan, The Stamp 
Act Crisis, 76-82; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 63; Thomas, British Politics, 
72- 76.
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place within the empire, their rights as Englishmen, and their power to 
persuade Parliament.
The Stamp Act Crisis -  Whig Ideology 
A  most unusual sight appeared on an early Saturday morning 
in the fall of 1765 in the center of Charleston. At the intersection of 
Broad and Church streets, a gallows rose "seventy feet high" with "an 
effigy, designed to present a distributor of paper" hanging between "a 
figure of a the devil on right hand, and on left a Boot, with a head 
stuck upon it." Throughout the day, Charleston residents filed by and 
gathered around, but -  according to the South Carolina Gazette -  no one 
dared "to disturb" this scene with the slogan "LIBERTY and no 
ST AMP-ACT" conspicuously scrawled upon it. As the sun set, two 
thousand Charleston residents watched as the "figures were taken 
down, and received" funeral-style "in a cart or wagon, drawn by eight 
or ten horses" which processed down "Broad-Street to the Bay...up 
Tradd Street, halting at the door of a house belonging to George Saxby, 
Esq; (the distributor of stamps)." While "great prudence" restrained 
"so great a number" from leveling the home, inevitable "injuries to the 
windows" occurred, not "owing. ..to any personal dislike of Saxby, but 
their detestation of the office."96
96 The South Carolina Gazette, October 19, 31, 1765.
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A drive for action in Charleston quickened in the weeks 
preceding the symbolic display of October 18, 1765. Since the first 
announcement of the Act, a "frightful Dream" settled over the port 
city. Uncertain how to respond, reactions ranged from suggestions in 
The South Carolina Gazette that local stamp officers should resign their 
commissions, to fears expressed by royal officials that "giddy minded" 
and "evil disposed persons" could incite uncontrollable riot among 
slaves and sailors.97 As Charleston residents made sense of these novel 
developments in imperial policy, anything seemed possible. For 
contemporaries, reaction to the Stamp Act Crisis occurred at the 
intersection of economic self-interest and political ideology. The 
taxation from Parliament challenged bottom lines, as well as colonists' 
conceptions of their rights as Englishmen. In Charleston this 
combination proved a combustible mixture.
The measures in the Stamp Act affected the pocketbook of 
nearly every inhabitant in South Carolina with the heaviest burden 
falling upon townsmen in Charleston. Planters, lawyers, and 
merchants faced a substantial rise in daily expenses as stamps were 
now required on basic deeds, legal documents, and marriage 
certificates, as well as, the documentation for every ship clearing the
97 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 53. The South Carolina Gazette, September 28, 1765.
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port (including the river vessels, which had long skirted customs 
enforcement). The cost to mechanics securing labor rose precipitously, 
for the price of a stamp on negotiating agreements with apprentices 
alone cost seven pounds, which constituted more than half the weekly 
earning of most masters. In public taverns and private homes, 
discussion of the Stamp Act met with "hearty damns" and reports of 
action underway in other ports to prevent the enforcement of the tax.98
Beyond their account books, the colonist's also faced crisis of 
political identity within the Empire by the imposition of this taxation 
without representation. As the colonial assemblies conflicted with 
royal governors and the presses published political news from the 
British Isles, colonial thinking about political rights were heavily 
influenced -  as Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and Pauline Maier have 
illustrated -  by the writings of English revolutionaries John Milton, 
Algernon Sidney, John Locke, Robert Molesworth, Benjamin Hoadly, 
John Trenchard, and Thomas Gordon, Francis Hutchenson, and 
Catherine Macauley. By the advent of the Stamp Act Crisis, South 
Carolina's political elites and newspaper editors sympathized with this
98 Richard Walsh illustrates how the mechanics secured labor. Master mechanics faced a tax on 
indentures costing 2 shillings 6 pence, and a further stamp for negotiating agreements with 
apprentices cosdng 7 pounds (accounting for more than half o f an average weekly earnings, 
which ranged between 30 and 45 shillings per day, and at most, 10.6 to 13.10 pounds per week 
Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 35.
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"Real Whig" or "Commonwealthman" tradition, and increasingly 
understood political developments through this lens.99
News stories from both shores of the Atlantic -  from the tales of 
John Wilkes to the various encroachments on freedom in Boston -  
were filtered through this Whig ideology into a larger sense of a 
conspiracy against liberty and of widespread abuse of power by 
ministers in London. What in retrospect appear as be separate 
struggles between local colonial assemblies and governors or an 
individual parliamentarian and the Crown, amassed in the minds of 
many in South Carolina into a full-scale, systematic attack on British 
liberty. The English form of government -  which Charleston colonials 
believed to be the greatest in the world -  was created by the people to 
promote the public weal. When those empowered violated the public 
trust, they forfeited their powers back to the people, who were then 
obligated to reconstitute that political authority.100
The protection of liberty and of the rights of Englishmen against 
tyranny necessitated constant vigilance by citizens, so that at the first 
abuse of power action could be taken. Since Whig political theory 
stressed that if tyranny "is suffered once, it will be apt to be repeated
99 This broader Anglo-American political tradition shaped colonist’s attitudes toward civil 
uprisings. Colonists thought o f themselves as part o f the Atlantic conversation, and applied 
Whig ideas about public authority and popular political responsibilities to local issues. Maier,
From Resistance to Revolution, 27.
100 Maier, From Fed stance to Revolution, 27-8.
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often; [and] a few repetitions create a habit/' It was, then, incumbent 
upon Charleston residents to definitively resist the Stamp Act, lest this 
"habit claim proscriptions and right."101 With the conception of 
themselves as important players in the British Empire, Charleston 
residents felt part of a larger struggle defending the British form of 
government. Daily newspapers confirmed this sense by keeping 
residents abreast of all the agitation and arguments in the Wilkes 
dispute and the happenings in other Northern colonies.
The conversation from the piers and streets that continued into 
the taverns and State House, paralleled discussions occurring 
throughout the American colonies of the British Empire. On July 19, 
1765, the Commons House of Assembly received the Circular Letter 
from Massachusetts calling for a meeting in New York to discuss a 
unified response to the Stamp Act. After some discussion, the 
Assembly voted to send Christopher Gadsden, Thomas Lynch (a 
wealth rice planter) and John Rutledge (a 26 year-old lawyer) to the 
extra-legal congress, specifically opting not to record the vote in the 
journal of the Commons House.102 Rejecting the advice of their colonial 
agent in London, the Commons Assembly also appointed a committee 
led byGadsden to prepare a reply to Parliament.
101 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 43.
102 Walter J. Fraser, Jr. Patriots, Pistols, and Petticoats: ‘Poor Sinful CharlesToum during the A. meric an 
Revolution.” {Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1993), 34; McDonough. Christopher 
Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 65; Ramsay, Histoy of South Carolina, 2:253.
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The South Carolinians denounced the legislation as both 
unconstitutional and, due to the currency shortage, untenable. The 
petition highlighted their ideological opposition stating, "The first, and 
in our opinion, the principle reason, against such a measure, is its 
inconsistency with that inherent right of every British subject, not to be 
taxed but by his own consent, or that of his representative." The 
Commons House urged repeal, expressing to Parliament its hopes that 
"when that august body comes to consider this matter they will view it 
in a more favorable light, and not deprive us of our birthright, and 
thereby reduce us to the condition of vassals and tributaries."103 Any 
loss of the traditional rights of Englishmen brought a terrible specter to 
light for the colonists: the possibility that Americans were not 
Englishmen, or as Christopher Gadsden asked, "in order to retain 
those.. .natural liberties of British subjects.. .a man must never stir out 
of Britain, where they are indisputably and essential his....[for] the 
moment he sets foot on American ground, he has bid farewell to the 
dearest of them?" Colonists, argued Gadsden, had emigrated with the 
belief that their fundamental rights were transplanted, for "no free
103 As quoted in R.W. Gibbes, Documentary Histoy of the American 'Revolution (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1855), 1:2-3; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 63; 
Committee o f Corresonpdence to Charles Garth, September 4, 1764.
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men, on such conditions, would have ever thought of coming to 
America."104
As the date for the first stamp duties November 1,1765 drew 
near, the petitioning campaign to Parliament -  a first response to 
offensive legislation -  appeared inadequate. For many in Charleston 
and ports to the North, it became increasingly clear that Parliament 
would not remove the offensive legislation without greater resistance 
Since the "constitutional method" of redress had failed, argued one 
letter in The South Carolina Gazette, resistance was necessary to 
circumvent the "prospect of future slavery."105 In Charleston, the 
message of radical Whig rhetoric received particular support from a 
ground swelling of opposition in mechanic's organizations like the 
Fellowship Society and the Charleston Fire Company.106
Action Unfolds -  The Stamp Act Crisis on the Streets of Charleston
The gallows scene of October 19,1765 vividly exhibiting the
threat posed by the stamps contained an additional warning -  those 
who "shall dare attempt to pull down these effigies, had better been
104Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 36.
105 The South Carolina Gazette, June 2,
106 Resistance to the Stamp Act; as illustrated by historian Richard Walsh, cemented an alliance 
between Gadsden and die mechanics which did not simply constitute a mob following a 
demagogue. Charles Gadsden appreciated the usefulness o f mechanics “whose worth no man in 
the city, perhaps is better acquainted with than myself.” Looking back after the Revolution, 
Gadsden reflected that “From the first off, and throughout the revolution, none have shewn 
themselves more firm and stead in the most dangerous and trying occasions.. .had it not been for 
their assitance, we should have made a very port figure indeed.’Walsh, Charleston’s Sons cfUberty, 
35, 39; McDonough, Gadsden and Laurens, 68.
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born with a mill stone about his neck, and cast into the sea/'107 As carts 
drew the grim figures down Broad Street toward the piers, the crowd 
swelled to over two thousand people who halted on Tradd Street 
before the house of George Saxby, the distributor of the stamps. When 
yells from the mob met silence, stones broke windows. Leaders of the 
procession struggled to prevent members of the crowd from leveling 
the home. Royal officials watched, utterly powerless.
As tensions heightened, the door was opened and a search 
revealed that Saxby and his family possessed none of the rumored 
stamps. Accompanied by a funeral dirge emanating from St. Michael's 
muffled steeple bells, the mob continued to a field where the effigies 
were burned and a coffin inscribed with "American Liberty" dutifully 
buried. Many in the crowd, still excited from the earlier processional, 
left the funeral for the taverns to drink "Damnations to the Stamp 
Act." As the mob converged that night to dissemble the display, form a 
parade, raid homes for stamps, and drink symbolic toasts -  a new 
more frightening vision appeared for Charleston's propertied whites: 
the real possibility of total, uncontrollable chaos in the streets.108
While Peter Timothy in The South Carolina Gazette insisted that 
the only reported damage -  a few broken w indows- could have been
107 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765.
108 P.R.S.C., XXX: 281-283,279-280; The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765.
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avoided if the home's inhabitants had answered sooner, for many 
wealthy merchants and planters the gallows scene raised a far more 
frightening specter than a few stamped papers.109 For Charleston 
residents, like their English counterparts, the presence of disgruntled 
crowds hardly suggested some novel development. Popular uprisings 
regularly occurred in reaction to impressments, to punish criminals, or 
to protest abuses of power by public officials. Annually, Charleston's 
interested classes watched celebrations of Pope's Day degenerated into 
brawls and debauchery.110 The demographics of the port's slave 
majority and white minority, however, predisposed merchants and 
planters towards limiting the size, strength, and recurrence of mobs.
Underlying all this action in the streets lay the widespread 
belief -  derived from radical Whig thought -  that when approved 
channels of redress for grievances proved inadequate or when officials 
abused their office, immediate action must occur to protect the rights 
of the citizens. Popular turbulence, as historian Paulina Maier 
describes, flowed "so naturally from inadequacies of government that 
riots and rebellions were often described with similes from the
109 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765; McDonough. Christopher G adsden and Henry 
Laurens. 68-9.
110 Maier. From Resistance to Revolution, 4,12; George Rude, The Crowd in History: A  Study of Popular 
Disturbances in France and England, 1730 -1848. (New York Wiley, 1964).
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physical world."111 Participants in the action on the streets of 
Charleston deemed their protest to be necessary. In their view, 
Parliament not only threatened English liberty but by repeatedly 
ignored petitions from the colony for redress violated a sacred trust. 
Members of the Charleston mob, then, possessed the right -  indeed, 
they believed, the duty -  to act outside of the bounds of law, as an 
extra-institutional check on the real abuse of power.
To be considered legitimate, the mob's actions needed to target 
the specific grievance (either physically or symbolically), receive the 
broad support of the community, and control any signs of disorder.112 
In Charleston, a constant tension between order and disorder defined 
much of the debate about mob action.113 As the ranks of protesting 
crowds swelled with sailors and slave-owners feared the actions of 
their property, Charleston's elite knew that weak law enforcement left 
them unprotected should the majority of the population suddenly
111 Members o f the British House o f Lords could acknowledge and argue that “rioting is an 
essential part of our constitution,” and even Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson, who 
lost his home to a mob, claimed that “Mobs, a sort o f them at least, are constitutional.” The key 
was retraining these mobs, and channeling the energies to productive or symbolic, not destructive 
purposes. Maiet, From Resistance to Revolution, 22,29.
112 In his study o f the crowd in France and England at this time, George Rude concludes that 
“mobs” proved “remarkably single-minded and discriminating” in their targets, which were 
chosen in relation to the grievance. George Rude, The Crowd in History.
113 Throughout this period, South Carolina’s agent Charles Garth continually warned the 
Assembly (which was reprinted in the newspaper) that news o f  violence and disorder from the 
colonies would not be well received in London. Garth and many merchants believed that reports 
o f mobs only hurt a petitioning campaign for repeal. Charles Garth to Committee of  
Correspondence December 23,1765, LP, 5:47-48.
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riot.114 Once lit, the tinderbox of socio-economic relationships in 
Charleston threatened to explode. This fear was confirmed when, only 
nights after the gallows scene, a mob disguised in "soot, sailors habits, 
and slouch hats" arrived at the door of several prominent officials 
again searching for stamps.115
On the night of October 23,1765, merchant factor Henry 
Laurens awakened to the sounds of a crowd gathering outside his 
home.116 Believing stamps to be hidden within the mansion, a mob 
amassed shouting "Liberty, Liberty & Stamp'd Paper, Open your doors & 
let us Search your House SzCellars In his correspondence, Laurens 
described the scene: a mob of sixty to eighty men banging on the door, 
threatening the "worse consequences" to his home and person, while 
his pregnant wife begged him to allow a search of their home. Upon 
opening the door "a brace of Cutlasses" met his chest, and Laurens
114 On violence and Whig thought: Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 13, 17, 39, 57.
115 Henry Laurens tojoseph Brown, October 11,1765, L P ,5:25.
116 Henry Laurens had previously voiced opposition to the Stamp Act, but did not support the 
actions on the street. Laurens, like many fellow merchants, urged fellow citizens to obey the 
Stamp Act until repeal occurred through lawful means. He expressed real concern that the 
violence in Boston would not “be feebly imitated by some turbulent spirits in this Metropolis.” 
He wrote to a friend in the days before his house was raided that, “Conclude not hence that I am 
an advocate for the Stamp Tax. No, by no means. I would give, I would do, a great deal to 
procure a repeal o f Law which imposes it upon us, but I am sure that nothing but a regular, 
decent, becoming representation o f the inexpediency & inutility o f the Law will have the desir’d 
effect & that all irregular seditious practices will have an evil tendency, even perhaps to 
perpetuate that & bring upon us other Acts o f Parliament big with greater mischiefs. Resignations 
which people here build so much upon can answer no good end. The Act must be executed & 
indeed a suspension o f it while it is in force would prove our ruin and destruction... In short 
there remains nothing for us at present to do but to shew a graceful obedience to the Law until 
we can procure in a constitutional way or to beat to Arms & I defy all the grumbletonians from 
Quebeck to West Rorida to point out a medium.” Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, Oct 11, 
1765,LP, 5:25.
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began trying to identify the leaders and members of the mob, 
addressing several of them by name. This failed to have any calming 
effect -  for according to Laurens -  the mob replied that they "Loved & 
respected me" and "would not hurt me or my property but that they 
were sent by some of my seemingly best friends to search for the 
Stamp'd Paper which they were certain was in my custody." A "very 
superficial search or no search at all" quickly took place and upon 
finding no stamps, the mob demanded Laurens swear an oath that he 
did not know the location of the stamps. Laurens outright refused, 
reiterating his opposition to the Stamp Act and state he "had 
voluntarily given my work & honour but would not suffer even that to 
pass my Lips by compulsion." The mob praised him and raised three 
huzzahs, before dissolving into the streets. After an hour of tense 
excitement, Laurens wrote of his amazement that the mob "did not do 
one penny damage to my Garden not even to walk over a Bed & not 15 
pounds damage to my Fence, Gate, or House."117
The midnight assaults upon the homes of Henry Laurens and 
Chief Justice Charles Shinner prompted wide speculation and debate 
about the nature of the Charleston mob and its legitimacy. The chief
117 Henry Lauren’s wife, Eleanor, gave birth to a son, James Laurens on November 26, who one 
o f Lauren’s close friends refered to as “George Libert/’ after the exploits o f this night.
Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 22, 28 1 765,LP, 5:27; Henry Laurens tojam es Grant 
(the royal governor o f East Florida), November 1,1765, January 29, 1766, LP, 5:55;McDonough, 
Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens, 70; David D. Wallace The Life of Henry Laurens (New York, 
1915), 119.
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questions became who constitutes the mob, and who's leading the 
mob. From the very first moments that the crowd surrounded his 
home, Laurens recognized "the Cloven foot of a certain malicious 
Villian," who incited the mob "from behind the Curtain who could be 
reached only by suspicion." Away in New York City at the Stamp Act 
Congress, Gadsden's name circulated as a "rash, ringleader of people" 
inciting "burglary and robbery" under the guise of constitutional 
principles.118
Since the mob formed in response rumors, Henry Laurens 
located the immediate source of his discontent with Peter Timothy 
who in his paper the South Carolina Gazette, "put your name into the 
Mouths of those Anti-Parliamentarians" making him the "sole 
projector as well as prompter of the [entire] Play."119 In a report to the 
Board of Trade, Lieutenant Governor Bull reiterated suspicions that 
Peter Timothy's paper the South Cnolina Gazette served as the "conduit 
pipe" for "busy spirits" to poison the colony with falsehoods "imbibed
118 While Gadsden did not send the mob to Lauren’s home, he never denounced its actions. In a 
letter written following his return to Charleston, Gadsden praised the crowd saying “Our people 
have behaved as firmly in the common cause as any upon the Continent, without having don the 
least mischief, and I make little doubt o f  their continuing so to do, though we have a number of 
cunning, Jacobi tical, Butean rascals...” Christopher Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson and 
Charles Garth, December 2, 1765.
119 While Timothy’s participation in Sons o f Libertyis clear,his leadership is questionable. He 
may have exaggerated, for example, when he informed Benjamin Franklin that the “Opposition 
to Tyranny was raised by a single inconsiderable Man here,” referring to himself, “under all the 
Discouragements imaginable, even Gadsden doubting whether it could be attempted.” Peter 
Timothy to Benjamin Franklin, June 12, 1777, ed. Douglas C. McMurtrie, Letters of Peter Timothy, 
Printer of Charleston, South Carolina, to Benjamin Franklin, Chicago: Black Cat Press, 1935), 17- 18; 
Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 28, 1765, LP, 5:30; Henry Laurens to James Grant, 
November 1, 1765, LP, 5:36.
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& propagated from Boston & Rhode Island."120 To those opposed to 
the mob, a handful of firebrands -  not the 'interested' community's 
consensus -  accounted for the actions of the mob. Challenging the 
basis of the m ob- as mere rabble roused by a few firebrands -  also 
challenged the legitimacy of their actions and causes.
In response to the gathering crowds and potential unrest, 
Lieutenant Governor Bull (acting as top royal official in South 
Carolina, in the absence of the royal governor), announced the 
following morning that all stamps had been deposited at Fort Johnson, 
guarded by soldiers to ensure peace.121 Alongside this announcement, 
each crown-appointed stamp official in Charleston publicly resigned 
their offices, asking on behalf of "his Majesty's colonies" the "repeal of 
an act that has created so much confusion."122 With the Stamp Act 
collection slated to begin November 1, it became clear that execution 
would be impossible. As Charleston residents began to calculate the 
effect of resistance upon their city (the closing of the courts, the port,
120 In lieutenant Governor Bull’s own words, “Some very extraordinary and universal 
commotions in the town” had occurred, prompted “by the artifices o f some busy spirits” who 
“universally poisoned” the “minds o f men. ..with the principles which were imbibed & 
propagated from Boston & Rhode Island.” This response was quite typical, to blame outside 
agitation on ideas arriving on ships from the port, or as Laurens’ did, on certain individuals. 
William Bull to Board o f Trade, November 3, 1765, PRO, v. 30, reel 10; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of 
Liberty, 36-7.
121 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, October 31,1765; William Bull to Board of 
Trade, November 3,1765, PRO, reel 10, vol. 30.
122 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765; McCrady, Royal Government, 571-2. P.R.S.C. XXX. 
281-283,279-280.
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the newspapers), the mechanic interest pushed the community 
towards sustained resistance.
With rumors circulating about plans for a Christmastime slave 
insurrection, the press for peace within the port met the wide support 
of Charleston's propertied merchants, planters, and wealthier 
mechanics. For many, the specter of anarchy prompted the 
consideration of new form of protest -  one that ensured order while 
channeling potential disorder, one that privileged propertied white 
involvement while marginalizing sailors and slaves, and one that 
ensured profits while bringing a swift repeal -  the answer came in the 
form of a non-importation association.123
Charleston's First Foray into Non-Importation 
With no stamps, the civil court and port of Charleston officially 
closed on November 1,1765. The Commons House of Assembly 
approved the resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, sending yet 
another series of petitions through their colonial agent in London.
123 In a city with a slave majority, controlling the violent action of mobs was the single most 
important goal o f South Carolina’s interested groups. Individuals were quite fearful that an 
uncontrolled mob would set alight other dissatisfied groups, particularly slaves. While some, like 
Henry Laurens believed the slave plot was nothing more than slave who “mimick’d their betters 
by crying out L.ibertyf Lieutenant Governor Bull acted quickly to prevent possible rebellion 
among the slaves. The fear o f revolt also calmed some o f the radical elements most ardent 
champions, including Gadsden, who expressed concern over mob action by April 1766, a fact 
with Henry Laurens noted to his correspondents with unrestrained glee. Henry Laurens to John 
Lewis Gervais, January 29, 1766, LP, 5:52-53; William Bull to Board of Trade, December 17, 
1765; Documents Illustrative of Slave Trade, 4:415; Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt Urban Life in 
America, 1743— 1776 (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 313; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston 
Mob and the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1765-1784,” 
Perspectives in American History, 4 (1970): 173- 96; Christopher Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson 
and Charles Garth, December 2,1765, WCG, 44.
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Colonial leaders from northern and southern ports crafted a common 
strategy of non-importation: an "ordered resistance" designed to 
channel potential unrest into a peaceful, limited form of protest.124 
Having exhausted "constitutional method[s]," Charleston residents 
"who had trusted to their representatives [in Parliament]" became 
"terrified at the prospect of future slavery" and signed onto non­
importation association. Ideally, this combination served to ensure a 
broad consensus among the propertied interest, while limiting the 
possibility of chaos.125
By the winter of 1765-1766, import trade reached a standstill. 
On wharves and streets throughout the port city, business adjusted to 
the new realities of non-importation. Without stamps, civil courts 
suspended business, indentured servants ran out their contracts, and 
Charleston's two newspapers lasted only a few weeks before stopping 
their presses.126 Barrels of rice cluttered the wharves and 
approximately fourteen-hundred unemployed sailors crowded the 
taverns.127 Tensions abounded in the port, particularly between the
124 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 76.
125 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 36, 64, 75.
126 Timothy later regretted this decision, as mentioned earlier in footnote 53. Jeffery A. Smith, 
“Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial Policies o f the South Carolina Gazette, 1732- 
17775,” journal of Southern History 49, no. 4 (November 1983): 511-26; Arthur M. Schlesinger,
“The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp Act,” New England Quarterly 8 (Marchl935): 63-82; 
Edmund and Helen Morgan, Stamp A ct Crisis, 242; Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, January 
29, 1766, L P ,  5:5434- 35.
127 To keep this growing number of seamen in line, the leaders o f the prote st movement (in 
concert with the actions o f Lieutenant Governor Bull, who reported that the sailors in larger 
number “grew licentious”) suppressed any sailors deemed unruly and frequently tossed supposed
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planter-merchant interest groups and the mechanics. Radical 
mechanics and the Liberty Boys found themselves forced to agree on 
an elongated list of goods in order to gain the support of Charleston's 
merchant and planter interest. And even though Christopher Gadsden 
prowled "the water side a night to see if anything [was] moving 
among the shipping" only limited efforts at enforcement occurred.128
Tensions within the non-importation movement heightened as 
Gadsden publicly accused the merchants of using the specter of slave 
insurrection and sailor tumult to "poison the minds of the people" in 
order to gain greater exceptions to an already weak scheme of 
protest.129 On the whole, the merchant and planters held the whip 
hand in Charleston, even forcing Lieutenant Governor Bull to permit 
ships to clear port under certain conditions that spring.130 At public 
meetings and in Charles Crouch's new paper, each interest group 
exchanged bitter accusations, and the delicate consensus appeared 
liable to dissolve at any moment. Across the Atlantic, however, the
ringleaders into jail. McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens, 73; Gov. William Bull to 
Conway, Charleston, February 6,1766, PRO Co 5.390, ff. 66-7. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 
71.
128 The South Carolina Gazette, February 25,1766; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of IJberiy, 39.
129 Fraser. Patriots, Pistols, and Petticoats, 36.
130 Radical elements tried to force the courts to open without stamped documents and the 
complete opening o f the port. Lieutenant Governor Bull allowed some degree o f violation, by 
allowing ships to leave for Florida, the Bermudas, and New Providence. He was motivated by 
fears that the British there would suffer famine and servile insurrection if Charleston’s commerce 
was halted. Eventually, aware o f possible outbreaks o f violence in Chadeston, he allowed 
clearance to all ships whose captains paid a sum equivalent to the charges required by the Stamp 
Act. P.R.S.C, XXX, 277-278, XXXI, 22 -251 Drayton, Memoirs, 89-91; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of 
JJbert)i, 39.
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American boycott stimulated lobbying activities of the commercial and 
manufacturing interests who applied pressure to Parliament. Suddenly 
-  right at the moment when non-importation faced tough questions in 
Charleston -news arrived of the "repeal [of] the dreadful Sentence."131 
Repeal and Reprieve -  Celebration in the Streets 
On June 9,1766, the first "REVIVED" issue of the South Carolina 
Gazette published news which had already reached every dock, alley, 
warehouse, tavern, inn, home, nook and cranny in Charleston: 
Parliament had repealed of the Stamp Act. Although rumors of repeal 
circulated for months, definitive news of the March repeal by 
Parliament arrived in the port in early May. Upon hearing the news, 
Christopher Gadsden "was so overcome.. .that he almost fainted." 
Spontaneous celebrations broke out around the town, for "all was Joy, 
Jollity, and Mirth," wrote Speaker of the Assembly Peter Manigault. 
The white Charleston residents "intoxicated with joy" planned a day 
of celebration for "our happy deliverance form the apprehensions of 
oppression and slavery" to correspond with King George's June 6th 
birthday.132
The morning began with a joyful ringing of St. Michael's bells 
and proud displays of British colors. Along the harbor, boats strung
131 Christopher Gadsden to Captain Burden, February 20,1766, Dartmouth Papers D  
1778/2/169.
132 The South Carolina Gazette, June 9, 1766.
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their colorful signal flags from mast to mast. From the fort, cannon 
shots fired in celebration. Throughout the streets, banners hung from 
townhouse windows. Royal officials and Sons of Liberty radicals alike 
celebrated Parliament's decision to repeal the Stamp Act. A parade of 
the colony's militia including Christopher Gadsden's artillery 
company processed for review by Lieutenant Governor Bull, the 
Council, the Assembly, and assorted public officials. Following the 
public displays, Lieutenant Governor Bull hosted a gathering at 
Dillon's Tavern providing "very elegant entertainment." At the dinner, 
"many loyal and constitutional toasts were drunk amongst which the 
best friends to Britain and America were not omitted." The celebration 
ended with a "grand and general" fireworks illuminating the 
harbor.133
Throughout the joyful occasion, Charleston's residents 
exchanged good cheer and spirits in even measure all around. To 
thank the King for his "great goodness," the Commons House of 
Assembly prepared an address and forwarded resolutions in his honor 
to demonstrate that "the inhabitants of this province [remain] a loyal 
and a grateful people." Alongside their praise for the King, the 
Assembly voted to erect a marble statue in honor of William Pitt for his
133 McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henty l^aurens, 76-77; The South Carolina Gazette June 9, 
1766.
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"noble and generous assistance toward obtaining the repeal," 
including such memorable lines from speeches as, "Americans are the 
sons not the bastards" of England.134 The statue -  the first of a public 
man in America -  erected on July 5 in the center of town, at the 
intersections of Broad and Meeting Street celebrated in stone this great 
moment of repeal, an achievement accomplished by South Carolinians 
and their allies.
In the euphoria of the moment, the Stamp Act repeal cemented 
among Charleston's merchants, planters, and mechanics their 
continued importance within the British Empire and their persuasive 
power within the halls of Parliament. When faced with the abuse of 
power, Charleston non-importers had successfully crafted a legitimate 
and peaceful protest in the model of their Whig ideals.135 Due to the 
timing of the repeal, Charleston's port residents avoided many of the 
tough questions demanded by protest that would resurface during the 
Townshend Revenue Crisis.136 In their minds at this moment -
134 Throughout the colonies, William Pitt was viewed as the star o f the repeal effort for his lines 
like, “I rejoice that America has resisted” and “Americans are the sons not the bastards” of 
England. His speeches were frequently reprinted and cited as indicative o f support for non­
importation and protest. Merchants in Charleston were offering a coin with Pitt’s profile on the 
side. Letters o f thanks to Pitt and perceived allies in England appeared in Charleston’s papers. 
Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 32, 71; The South Carolina Gazette March 
30, April 20,1767; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal April 29, May 13, 1766.
135 Maier, From Resistance to Evolution, 74.
136 Particularly, questions about enforcement, leadership, and participation.
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Charleston non-importation association members had formed a 
persuasive argument for repeal, sacrificed to protest injustice, and 
ultimately convinced Parliament of their legitimacy.
Enthusiastically celebrating their triumph in protecting the 
rights of Englishmen, Charleston's celebrating throngs -  like those in 
other ports -  largely ignored the ominous wording of the Declaratory 
Act passed alongside the Stamp Act repeal. The majority of colonists 
felt that the British government supported their interpretation of the 
constitutional question, a belief reinforced by colonial news outlets. In 
her survey of Southern newspapers, historian Carol Knight, found that 
the news appearing from London and British cities focused primarily 
on three optimistic stories, including: the double repeal of the Stamp 
Act and English Cider Act, the ministry's future plans for increasing 
trade in the American colonies, and the likelihood of a change in 
ministers which would benefit the colonies.137 These rumors of 
positive change in the wake of non-importation bolstered Charleston
137 Among news items being published alongside the repeal celebrations, included rumors and 
speculations o f new plans which the Rockingham ministry were forming for America (not 
necessarily bad news), plans o f creation o f a duty-free port in Dominica (a real boon for 
Charleston business), and potential changes in currency policy to aid the cash-poor colonies. 
These rumors o f changes in imperial policy were read alongside descriptions of individuals in 
England who had lobbied and acted on behalf o f the American colonies, including royal 
governors, manufacturing towns in the England, and merchant houses. In toto, southeners 
received a fairly rosey picture o f future imperial policies, even as disturbances from northern 
colonies began to filter into papers. Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Tonmshend Crisis. 22, 
24, 27, 29, 32, 46- 49; The South Carolina and American G eneral Galette Augus 1 1, 1766.
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residents' perceptions of the power of their actions.138 Through action, 
colonists believed they had influenced policymakers during the Stamp 
Act Crisis in particular directions, establishing a precedent and 
encouraging future protest.139
While most colonials "Thank[ed] God" that South Carolina 
became "now again, the land of liberty," Christopher Gadsden and 
fellow radicals organized a somber meeting beneath the Liberty Tree. 
Standing before a high-spirited bunch of Charleston's mechanics, 
Gadsden- one participant recalled after -  "harangued them at 
considerable length." In pure "folly" Charleston's residents "relax[ed] 
their opposition and vigilance...indulging the fallacious hope that 
Great Britain would relinquish her designs and pretensions." Before 
the crowd, he read the preamble of the Declaratory Act, "pressing 
upon them the folly of rejoicing at a law" which "asserted and 
maintained the absolute dominion of Great Britain" over the colonies. 
Couching his argument in radical Whig rhetoric, Gadsden outlined 
"all the chances of succeeding in a struggle to break the fetters... 
imposed on them," to which mechanics joined hands and "swore their 
defense against tyranny."140
138 Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Towns bend Crisis. 25; Maier, From Resistance to 
Revolution, 107; The South Carolina Gazette, June 16,1766.
139 McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Taurens, 77; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 41.
140 Gibbes, Documentary History, 1764-1776, pp. 10-11; Johnson, Traditions andReminenscences, 28-29; 
Burton, South Carolina Silversmiths, IT, Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty 40; Knight, The American
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Beyond the Liberty Tree's reaches, other colonial residents also 
noted that the once celebrated victory remained incomplete. As details 
of the Stamp Act repeal filtered in, skeptical observers cautioned their 
fellow colonists that the 240 to 133 victory of repeal in Parliament 
represented a comfortable, but hardly secure majority. That the 
Declaratory Act passed in rapid succession to the vote further 
challenged Charleston merchants' and planters' perceptions of their 
power within the Empire.141 Many felt, like Henry Laurens, that 
despite new statues and shared toasts, "all America will undergo 
many pangs yet before there is a hearty reconciliation."142
Repeal of the Stamp Act did not solve the issues dividing 
Anglo-America.143 As we know in hindsight, colonial opposition in 
Charleston reawakened in 1769 in response to the Townshend 
Revenue Act of 1767. Those carefully reading the news or 
corresponding with London merchants noted that -  not only did 
London policymakers disapprove of American actions during the 
Stamp Act Crisis -  a growing number argued that the petulant non­
importers deserved to be punished, tamed, and reminded of the
Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 24; South Carolina and American General Gazette June 6,1766; 
The South Carolina Gazette and Country journal June 17, 1766.
141 Charles Garth to Committee o f Correspondence, February 25, 1766, LP, 5:128-9.
142 Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, May 12,1766, LP, 5:129-30; Henry Laurens to John 
Lewis Gervais, September 1, 1766,LP, 5:184.
143 An essay printed on April 15, 1768, The South Carolina and American General Gazette voiced many 
o f these tensions and fears. Paraphrasing Barre, the author reiterated that Parliament was no  
longer treating America as its children, warning that i f  Britain became a tyranny, America would 
not willingly become her slaves. The South Carolina and American Genera I Gazette, April 15,1768.
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authority of Parliament. Many in England described how "alarming" 
the "disturbances from North America" were "to those Gentlemen 
who have large sums due them there." Letters from London often 
expressed a measured support for the American position during the 
crisis with the persistent caveat: "except for the acts of violence".144 No 
one within the port or within the colony, however, saw in this moment 
foresaw revolution.145
The intervening years between the euphoric summer of repeal 
in 1766 and the contentious summer of dissent in 1769, further 
challenged Charleston's interested classes' perceptions of their place in 
the empire, their powers of persuasion in London, and their 
understanding of the dynamics within their own community. The 
Townshend Revenue Act Crisis in Charleston developed, as describe 
above, from divergent and contentious trajectories from individual's 
economic and ideological experiences in the years following the Stamp 
Act Crisis.
Charleston entered the period of imperial regulation as a 
peripheral community convinced of its own centrality. For planters, 
merchants, and mechanics this belief came increasingly under assault
144 The South Carolina Gazette, June 16, 1766; The South Carolina and American General Gazette, August 
8,1766; Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 -  1770,31.
145 Maier, From Resistance to Evolution, xviii, x-xi,xx, 114; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston Mob and 
the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1675-1784.”
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by renewed enforcement of customs,146 a critical currency shortage,147 a 
rash of bankruptcies,148 as well as, news from northern colonies. 
Throughout the colony, mechanics and planters suffered the harsh 
economic realities of economic downturn. Within the city, wealthy 
merchants recalled the street scenes during the Stamp Act Crisis, 
remaining deeply concerned -  even paranoid -  about a "contagion of 
liberty" spreading among the black majority and itinerate sailors. The 
quick formation and power of mobs reminded Charleston's power 
structure of its tenuous position. Despite their apparent success in the 
Stamp Act Crisis, individuals within the port city carefully calculated
146 On customs enforcement: In the spring o f 1767, a new royal customs collector arrived in 
Charleston. Daniel Moore quickly alienated himself from nearly every resident o f the port, 
particulady the merchant interest by his tactics, vigor, and methods. Moore proved particularly 
interested in tightening customs enforcement to increase his own personal fortunes. As 
mentioned above, the most famous case among many, occurred in the Spring o f 1767 -Mien 
coastal schooners — Broughton Island Packet and Wambaw — owned by Henry Laurens were 
confiscated for not properly clearing die port. Laurens became so angry that he not only brought 
suit against the customs collector, but upon spotting Moore on a crowded Charleston street, 
twisted his nose and yelled at him. Laurens’ case came to be heard in Charleston’s new vice 
Admiralty court under judge Egerton Leigh (a relative o f  Laurens by marriage). In the meantime, 
customs collector George Roupell was found guilty by a local jury and ordered to pay damages. 
To retaliate, Roupell and P.H. Hatley ceased another ofLaurens’ ships, and offered to release the 
vessel if Lauren’s would not collect the damages. Laurens was incensed at this extortion. A 
situation which could have been diffused, now worsened into a series o f bitter exchanges and 
attacks in the newspaper accusing public officials o f  working in their own self-interest. Lauren’s 
pamphlets circulated widely in the colonies. Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 23-24; Calhoon 
and Weir, “Scandalous History o f Sir Egerton Leigh,” 53; Henry Laurens Extractsfrom the 
Proceedings cf the Court of Vice-Admiralty in Charles-Tmm, South Carolina reprinted HE, 6:189 — 216 
(The Papers of Henry Eaurens (HE) ed. George C. Rogers et al., 16 vols.)
147 On the currency crisis: Correspondence in newspapers indicated that many in England 
believed that there would be plenty o f  cash in America to pay the taxes. Knight, The American 
Colonial Press and the Toimshend Crisis. 24, 70; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal, 
December 23, 1766, May 5, 1767; South Carolina and American General Gazette, January 23,1767;
148 The increasing collection o f debts particularly affected Charleston’s planters and mechanics. 
See more information above. The South Carolina Gazette September 7, 1769, May 30, 1769; Walsh, 
Charleston’s Sons qfEiberty, 42-45; Miscellaneous Court Records, 1770-1771, 98,99, 100,110, 264, 
338, 374,392-393; Records o f  the Court o f Common Pleas, 1767, 135,178, 211, 212,272-274, 
393-396; Minute Book o f the Fellowship Society, 1769-1779; Gayle, “The Nature and Volume o f  
Exports from Charieston, 1724-1774,” pp. 31-33; Ship Registers, 1730-1774.
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risk versus reward in their reaction to the Townshend Revenue Acts in 
1767. For all the earlier toasts to Liberty and "Damnation to the Stamp 
Act," residents of Charleston appeared at first, wholly uncertain of
how to react to this new revenue measure.
*  *  *
Chapter 2: Charleston at the Arrival of Townshend -  
Inaction, Contention, Consensus
"Whereas it is expedient that a revenue should be raised in your 
Majesty's dominions in America" declared Parliament in the Revenue 
Act of 1767, "for making a more certain and adequate provision for 
defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support 
of the civil government.. .and towards further defraying the expenses 
of defending, protecting, and securing, the said dominions. ..have 
therefore resolved to give and grant unto your Majesty the several 
rates and duties herein after mentioned." This preamble to a bill more 
commonly refered to in the American colonies as the Townshend 
Revenue Act flowed from the pen of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Charles Townshend as a new plan for rationalizing colonial 
administration.149
149 Charles Townshend’s ideas about taxing and regulating American trade had been taking shape 
for at least a decade with other ministers and policymakers. The tax schemes were not the result 
o f unilateral action by Townshend, but had the general support o f the cabinet and Parliament. 
Great Britain. The Statutes at Large. ..[from 1225 to 1867] by Da nby Pickering (Cambridge: Printed 
by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst); Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 77-78; 
Walter H. Conser, Jr. and Ronald M. McCarthy, “Circular Letters, Customs Officers and the 
Issue o f Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance,” in Resistance, Politics and 
the American Strugglefor Independence 1765 1775, ed. by Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy,
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The problem of extracting colonial revenue that plagued King 
George Ill's ministers became increasingly urguent by 1767, as the 
annual cost of garrisoning the army units in America approached 
400,000 pounds, nearly twice the original estimates. The act raised 
funds through taxes, which could be defended as trade duties to 
colonists' constitutional arguments against interal taxation. 
Additionally, the act provided measures to "more effectually prevent 
the clandestine running of goods in the colonies and plantations." This 
act appealed to members of Parliament by providing funds, reasserting 
imperial authority, and reassuring the royal rule of law and order in 
each colony. Conversly, this act threatened colonists in America by 
extracting funds, reasserting imperial authority, and undermining the 
political gains of the popularly elected branches of government.150
In October 1767, Boston became the first port to renew non­
importation in response to the Townshend Revenue Act, followed in
DavidJ. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986), 119 - 
39.
150 Charles Townshend’s ideas about taxing and regulating American trade had been taking shape 
for at least a decade with other ministers and policymakers. The tax schemes were not the result 
o f unilateral action by Townshend, but had the general support o f the cabinet and Parliament. 
Great Britain. The Statutes at Targe... [from 1225 to 1867] by Da nby Pickering (Cambridge: Printed 
by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst); Knight, The American Colonial Tress and the Townshend Crisis 77-78; 
Walter H. Conser, Jr. and Ronald M. McCarthy, “Circular Letters, Customs Officers and the 
Issue o f Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance,” in Resistance, Politics and 
the American Strugglefor Independence 1765 1775, ed. by Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, 
David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986), 119 - 
39.
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succession by fellow northern ports.151 Although news of these 
protests, copies of John Dickinson's influential "Letters from a Farmer 
in Pennsylvania," and various other attempts to incite action appeared 
on the broadsides of each of Charleston's newspapers, the port 
appeared -  at least among the propertied whites -  largely uninterested 
in adopting any scheme of "strict OECONOMY."152 Among the 
colony's political elite (i.e. the wealthy planters and merchants) word 
of new Regulator disturbances in the backcountry were considered a 
far greater threat to South Carolina's economy and stability than a few 
small duties on paper, tea, and miscellaneous goods.153 For mechanics 
and indebted planters, the opposite appeared true, prompting somber 
rallies under the Liberty Tree to toast Boston and "to see how far they 
could follow the laudable example of their brother tradesmen in New 
York."154 Meanwhile, merchants calculated the costs and benefits to
151 News that Boston was organizing a non-importation and non-consumption movement arrived 
in Charleston as early as November 1767. South Carolina and American General Gazette, November 
13, 20, 1767; The South Carolina Gazette, December 14, 1767.
152 The South Carolina Gazette, March 14,1768, April 1,1768; The South Carolina Gazette and County 
Journal, J anuary 5, 1768; Knight, The American Colonial Press and theTownshend Crisis. 94, 101-2; 
Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 114-5; William Bull to early o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768, 
PRO, reel 10, vol. 32.
153 Internal problems within the colony dominated discussion in die Assembly from 1767 and 
throughout much for 1768. By September 1768, writers could declare “apprehension from the 
Regulators is over and we are generally convinced that our fears were groundless. Happy people 
should we be, if every man might pursue his proper Occupation; but no sooner are we at rest at 
home than we are alarmed from Abroad, and the most imminet danger threatens.” Refocusion 
attention from the backcountry to the lowcountry, the writer declared “We are no longer 
Strangers to the Measures Great Britain is determined to use 'in treating with her loyal colonies in 
America.” The South Carolina Gazette, October 11, 1768; The South Caro Ena and American General 
Gazette, September 16, 23, 1768.
154 See above. The South CaroEna Galette,]~an.e. 1, 8, 15,1769.
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calls for resumption from their northern peers.155 Newspapers became 
a central forum for the debates over resumption of non-importation to 
occur.156
June 8,1769 - The Press for Action 
Through their inaction, Charleston's planters and mechanics,
argued the 'Planter from Pedee/ "bought" the "rod for our own
breech."157 The arrival of Lord Hillsborough's congratulations to "our
friends in trade" for treating Boston's "circular letter...with the
SILENT contempt it deserved," provided the author with the spark to
alight a tinderbox in hot, dry summer of 1769. In allowing the
merchant interest, "mere Bird of Passage., .here to make a fortune," to
speak for the community those interests "fixed to the country" left
Charleston lagging behind "her noble sister colonies" in asserting their
rights within the Empire. While the merchants earn praise from
imperial ministers for "act[ing] like A WISE AND PRUDENT people"
amid the crisis of the Townshend Revenue Act inaction on the part of
South Carolina's planters, mechanics, and freeholders threatened true
English liberty. Now was the time for action, wrote Christopher
Gadsden as the 'Planter from Pedee,' for planters and mechanics
155 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, June 3, 1768, December 5, 26 17 68.
156 For more examples o f toasts see: South Carolina and American General Gazette, May 13, 1768, 
November 30,1768, December 5,1768; For more on the possible efficacy o f petitions: Knight, 
The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 121-28; The South Carolina and American General 
Gazette, May 6,1768, May 13, 1768; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal, January 28, 1768.
157 The South Carolina Gazette, June 8,1769.
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"cannot expect the merchants" to again "desist from  importations"
following Hillsborough's "compliment."158 After two years of delay, 
the first June issue of theSouth Carolina Gazette ushered in a summer 
where -  at the intersection of self-interest and ideology -  a contested 
protest reemerged in a city famous for its harmony.159
June 15,1769 -  Charleston's First Agreement 
The South Carolina Gazette informed its readers on June 15,1769
"Several Societies of Gentlemen in this Town" had formed in answer
to the Planter's challenge. For over a year, letters from Boston
merchants to their Charleston peers urging cooperation and resistance
"were handed from man to man," Lieutenant Governor William Bull
Jr. reported to London, with "Silent Neglect."160 Despite exuberant
toasts to liberty and celebrations of English patriots that followed the
repeal of the Stamp Act, the booming port city appeared largely
uninterested in resuming a regime of "strict OECONOMY" in
i58The South Carolina Gazette, June 22,1769; William Henry Drayton, Letters of Freeman (London, 
1771), 1-5.
159 The debate which began this paper, the Planter from Pedee appeared in the South Carolina 
Gazette, as did Christopher Gadsden’s subsequent letter as “Pro Grege et Rege” addressed “To 
Planters, Mechanicks, and Freeholders o f the province” declaring that never before “were so 
glaringly a few against us” than the importers, stigmatized as strangers in the province.
Maier RtR 135, Walsh,Gadsden, “To the Planters, Mechanics,and Freeholders of...South 
Carolina,” June 22, 1769, in Gadsden Writims. 77.
SCG. 1769
160 Boston adopted a non-importation agreement in October 1767, and most o f  the northern 
colonies soon followed. February 1768, Massachusetts sent the circular letter challenging the 
constitutionality of the Townshend Acts and asking for cooperation among the colonies in 
securing their repeal. Throughout the colonies, petitions were drawn in response and forwarded 
by assemblies to colonial agents in London to be presented to the King. Events beyond the 
Townshend Acts themselves, such as their seizure o f John Plancock’s sloop Liberty and the 
quartering controversy in Boston and N ew  York also hastened pressure for action. Public Records 
of South Carolina (British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56 Cited hereafter as P.R.S.C; Leila Sellers, 
CharlestonBusiness on the Eve of the American Revolution. (New York; Amo Press, 1970), 204.
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response to the Townshend Revenue Acts.161 Within days of the 
Planter's exhortations and the societies meeting, the first agreement 
since the Stamp Act to "purchase no kind of British Goods that can be 
manufactured in America," circulated around the Charleston.162
Following weeks of maneuvering and posturing, the 
announcement on June 15 of an association vowing to "cloathe 
themselves in homespn as soon as it can be got," precipitated a tense 
standoff within the port.163 "WE, His Majesty's dutiful and loving 
Subjects," began Charleston's first renewal of non-importation 
published June 22,1769, "being sensibly affected" by "the abject and 
wretched condition to which the BRITISH COLONIES are reduced by 
several Acts of Parliament," believe we can "most probably 
procure...Relief" do "solemnly promise" that "until the Colonies be 
restored to their former Freedom, by the Repeal of the said Acts, we 
will most strictly abide by the following RESOLUTIONS." After 
carefully articulating both grievances and prior petitions, the non­
importation association pledged to "encourage and promote...the use 
of NORTH-AMERICAN MANUFACTURES" by not importing "Any 
of the Manufactures of GREAT-BRITAIN" except from those items 
"such as may have been shipped in consequence of former Orders" or
161 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
162 The South Carolina Gazette, June 15, 1769;
163 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, 1769, July 22, 1769.
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i"NEGRO CLOTH, DUFFIL BLANKETS, OSNABURGS, 
PLANTATION and WORKMENS TOOLS, POWDER, LEAD, SHOT, 
CANVAS, NAILS, SALT, COALS, WOOL CARDS, CARD WIRE, 
printed BOOKS and PAMPLETS." Upon signing, association members 
agreed not to "raise the Prices" and to "immediately countermand all 
Orders."164
In "our Persons, Families, Houses and Furniture," non­
importation supporters vowed to exercise "the utmost OECONOMY" 
in particular vowing to "use NO MOURNING, nor give Gloves and 
Scarves at Funerals." Now published and disseminated, the authors 
and signers, looked to "every Inhabitant of this Colony, who refuses or 
neglects to sign this Agreement within one Month...as no Friend to the 
true Interest of the Colony" and swore "upon no Account, at any 
Time...to purchase from...such a Person." Those "Gentlemen desirous of 
promoting so laudable and at this Time evidently necessary" an association 
should immediately "set their Hands" upon "Blank Copies of the above 
Agreement" at "TIMOTHY'S Office in Broad-Street [printing house of the 
South Carolina Gazette]...at Mr. ISAAC MOTTE'S on the Bay, and 
CHRISTOPHER GADSDEN, Esq'g where Charleston residents might
164 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
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also view "a List of the Names of many respectable Gentlemen" already 
pledged.165
June 30 -Ju ly  7 ,1769 -  The Merchant Interest Responds 
With no association, the merchants appeared to be abdicating
control over the contours of dissent to the planter and mechanic 
interests. Facing an aggressive challenge from radical leadership, 
anxiously predicting financial hardship under the circulating non­
importation scheme, and fearful of losing their position to a 
strengthening planter-mechanic alliance, the Charleston merchants 
took action. On June 30, the merchant interest gathered at Dillon's 
Tavern to respond to the sudden resumption of non-importation. 
Aware that remaining aloof only invited more extreme measures, the 
large meeting appointed a committee to draft a rival non-importation 
plan aimed at both moderating the mechanics -  Charleston's most 
radical element -  and cementing a traditional planter-merchant 
alliance.166
On July 7, the merchants "in a Number near eighty" presented their 
scheme "without one differenting voice." Declaring that "WE ...feeling 
ourselves burthened and sensibly affected, by the many Impositions of 
Taxes.. for the Purpose of raising a Revenue in AMERICA" vow to "adopt
165 The South Carolina Gazette, June 13, 22, 1769.
166 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; July 6, 13, 1769; William Henry Drayton, Tetters of 
Freeman, 1-5; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty, 47-8; Sellers, Charleston Business on theFve of the 
A. meric an devolution, 207.
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every Plan o/OECONOMY" and "hereby solemnly promise and 
engage. .. that we will faithfully observe and keep the following 
RESOLUTIONS." Seeking a balance between the Stamp Act 
precedents, the rival mechanic-planter scheme, and their own interests, 
the authors and subscribers agreed "from and after this Day, we will 
not im port...and European or East-India Goods...(but such as may be 
already ordered and cannot be countermanded) either from Great- 
Britain, Holland, or any other Place whatsoever, until the first Day of 
January, 1778, unless the Revenue-Acts...should be sooner repealed."
Demarcating a clear beginning and ending date, the authors also 
allowed "the following Articles" to be imported: "NEGRO 
CLOTH.. .striped DUFFIL BLANKETS— OSNABURGS -  coarse white 
LINENS, not exceeding One Shilling and Six Pence Sterling per Yard— 
CANVAS—BOLTING CLOTHS—DRUGS and FAMILY 
MEDICINES—PLANTATION and WORKMENS TOOLS -  NAILS -  
WIRE CARDS- FIRE ARMS -  BAR STEEL -  GUN POWDER -  SHOT- 
LEAD -  FLINTS -  SALT -  COALS -  SALT-PETRE -  MILL and 
GRIND-STONES." The merchant's non-importation association 
adopted similar language to Charleston's Stamp Act precedent, but 
allowed a greater number of goods to be imported. Beyond the 
extensive list of exceptions, signers agreed to countermand orders,
"not purchase from any Masters of Vessels, transient Persons, or Non-
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Subscribers" forbidden goods "excepting COALS and SALT," to sell 
all items "at the same Rates" as before, that "from and after the first 
Day of January 1770, to the first Day of January 1771 we will not 
IMPORT, BUY or SELL, any NEGROES that shall be brought into this 
province from AFRICA" nor after "the first Day of October next, any 
NEGROES that shall be imported from the WEST-INDIA ISLANDS, or 
ANY OTHER PLACE, unless the said Acts should be sooner repealed," 
and added "WINES" to the list of forbidden good due to the "heavy 
Duty" imposed upon them. Those subscribers "who shall not, strictly 
and literally, adhere" to the resolutions "will deserve to be treated 
with the utmost Contempt."167 The merchants tipped their hats 
towards small merchants, planters, and even mechanics in shaping the 
association's requirements, but in whole, the association protected the 
economic interests of its promoters.168 The inclusion of specific 
deadlines served to limit the scope of protest. As the meeting 
adjourned, the merchants felt confident of the successful adoption of 
their association by the community in Charleston.169
Eager to press their position, the merchants released an open 
response to the "Planter from Pedee" alongside the publication their
167 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769; TheSouth Carolina Gazette and Country Journal, July 10, 
25, 1769.
168 j'fog South Carolina Gazette, July 9, 13, 1769; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American 
Revolution, 56.
169 The South Carolina Gazette, July 9, 1769.
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newly penned non-importation association. Published in Charleston's 
three major newspapers, the "MERCHANTS OF CHARLESTOWN" 
systematically refuted the accusations "Published in Mr. Timothy's 
Gazette on the 22d of last Month." The merchants offered this 
"Vindication" not for the "anonymous Writer," who "we regard 
w ith .. .indifference," but to "lay before the publick" their position 
supported by justifications of protest in radical Whig tradition. In 
response to the "Aspersions thrown" on the merchants for treating the 
circular letter with "silent Contempt," Charleston factors argued that 
fewer than "a Fifth Part of the People in Trade had an Opportunity of 
seeing The Letter." Indeed, the Planter from Pedee took "uncommon 
Pains to Misrepresent us to our Fellow-subjects" as "Strangers, many 
of but a few years standing.. .who have never shown.. .any Thing 
but. ..Regard for ourselves and our own private interests." Had he 
"been disposed to give himself any Time for Recollection," the 
merchants responded, the Planter would certainly have remembered 
the times that "the Merchants alone...boldly stood forth, and, at an 
enormous Expense solely defrayed by themselves" protesting and 
defeating "a plan that would have subjected the Planting Interest to 
inconceivable Hardships."170
170 The South Carolina Gazette, July 22, 1769; TheSouth Carolina and A.merica General Gazette,July 17, 
1769.
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Once established in their past protest credentials, the merchants' 
response continued by denouncing the methods of the "Planter from 
Pedee" and the first non-importation association in Real Whig 
tradition. The mechanic's agreement represented little more than "an 
unjust Attempt of one Part of the Community.. .to throw a Burthen on 
the Rest more grievous than.. .the most arbitrary Minister of the most 
despotic King." The new motto "SIGN or BE RUINED," adopted by 
those supporting the "Planter from Pedee," "strikes at the Welfare of 
each Individual" embodying "nothing but a Spirit of Tyranny." The 
first "Plan of Economy" provides for but "two Parts of the 
Community" by "necessarily increase[ing] the Landholders Estates" 
and allowing the import of "such Articles as they and the Mechanicks 
indispensably want," leaving "the third" -  the merchants -  "subjected 
to infinite Hardships and Distress." If, suggested the merchants citing 
common belief of English Whig radicals, "hardship must be borne for 
the general Good, each individual should be consulted" and the 
resulting "Plan adopted...would make the Burden equal."171 Thus the 
second non-importation association should be adopted as the only 
mutually consensual -  and therefore legitimate -  scheme of protest.
Contest
171 The merchants also respond through a letter from PRO LIBERATATE ET LEGE. The South 
Carolina and America General Gazette,]\Ay 7, 10, 1769; TA South Carolina Gazette, July 13, 1769; The 
South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal, July 7, 1769.
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The South Carolina Gazette broadside announced the merchants' 
association and their letter below a reprinting of the first non­
importation association (including an additional, italicized clause 
urging unity behind a single protest organization) and a preemptive 
response by "A Mechanic."172 On a single broadside, Charleston 
residents faced two contested protest associations. Why would "ANY 
PLANTER, MECHANIC, or OTHERinhabitant, DISTINCT^rom their 
body" subscribe to "their Resolutions" which "do not contain a single 
syllable for ENCOURAGING AMERICAN MANUFACTURES." As 
both sides jockeyed for support, the Mechanic continued that, although 
the merchants complain that "each individual should be consulted," but 
"Were anybesides MERCHANTS, invited to their meeting...as at ours? 
That "so unpardonable an omission happened," the community must 
"unanimously adhere to our FIRST PLAN, with exemplary firmness." 
Only in consensus for the first plan, 'A  Mechanic' argued, could the 
"ESTABLISH-MENT of American Manufactures" occur.173 The debate 
borrowed claims of legitimacy from traditions of English dissent but 
represented the economic self-interest of their authors.174
Consensus
172 By this time, the publisher o f The South Carolina Gazette, Peter Timothy, was an ardent 
supporter o f the radical interests, as will be examined below.
173 The South Carolina Gazette. July 13, 1769; Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty, 48.
174 Legitimate resistance, it was believed, must involved the body o f the people, must take 
peaceful forms over violence, and must confine itself to proscribed limits. Maier, From Resistance to 
Revolution, 114.
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"During the Fortnight past," reported The South Carolina and 
American General Gazette, "several Proposals have been made...for 
stopping the Importation of Goods...till the Revenue Acts shall be 
Repealed" with "many" already signing "Resolutions for that 
Purpose."175 Even as merchants and mechanics exchanged bitter 
accusations -  readers learned of several "proposals" underway "for 
One General" agreement.176 The drive for consensus stemmed in large 
part from common concerns that mechanics, merchants, and planters 
all shared about renewed disorder by slaves and sailors in the port. 
Past experience during the Stamp Act Protest and Whig tradition 
stressed that legitimate resistance involved the body of the people, in 
peaceful forms, defining clear limits to agitation.177
The individuals who joined non-importation efforts in Charleston 
genuinely believed in their community's ability to force Parliament to 
repeal the Townshend Revenue Acts through protest, and so the 
central question became deciding upon the most effective form for that 
protest. In the period of negotiations, mechanics and the planters held 
"the whip hand." Overtures for a combined agreement by merchants 
fearing more extreme actions resulted in a joint committee to draft a
175 TheSouth Carolina and American General Gazette. July 4, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette and 
Country Journal ,]\Ay 4, 25, 1769.
176 The South Carolina and American General Gazette. July 17, 1769.
177 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 114.
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uniform agreement distilling the essentials of the two rival 
agreements.178
On July 22, 1769, serving as president of the public meeting 
Christopher Gadsden read aloud a new compromised plan. By 
acclaim, the crowd of planters, mechanics, and merchants voted 
"unanimously" to support a third non-importation agreement which, 
reported The South Carolina and American General Gazette "we have no 
reason to doubt will be satisfactory to...every Freeman in the 
Province."179 The agreement combined the first and second non­
importation associations, ultimately granting greater allowances for 
the merchant and planter economic interests, while expanding the 
power of the mechanics. The conflict over protest that emerged on 
June 15 as mechanics drafted a non-importation association in direct 
opposition to the merchants' inaction, developed into a period with 
two competing organizations, and ultimately ended with an agreement 
amenable to the merchant and planter interests, that endowed 
mechanics for the first time with equal political power in the 
association, a power they would continue to exercise throughout the 
Revolution.
178 Sellers. Charleston business on the Eve of Revolution. 208,219.
179 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 49.
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After reiterating the grievances enumerated in the first agreement, 
the signers "whose names are under-written" agreed to "most strictly 
abide the following RESOLUTIONS.. .until the colonies be restored to 
their former freedom, by the repeal of the said acts." To acknowledge 
the mechanics' demands, signers promised to "encourage and promote 
the use of NORTH AMERICAN MANUFACTURES in general, and 
those of this province in particular," with vendors applying "the same 
rates a heretofore." As well, the importation, buying, or selling of "any 
NEGROES. ..brought into this Province from Africa" would go into 
effect "After the first day of January 1770," while the moratorium of 
the importation of "any NEGROES...from West-Indies or any other 
place" began the "first day of October next."
In negotiations, the list of goods excepted grew to include all the 
exceptions of the merchant's association as well as "BOLTING 
CLOTHS" and "Fish-Hooks." All non importation members pledged to 
observe "the utmost oeconomy in our persons" and "particularly" to 
"give no mourning or gloves or scarfs at funerals." Within a month, 
"any resident" of South Carolina "that refuses or neglects to sign the 
agreement," would receive no business from signers. While 
borrowing the language of previous agreements -  that "every 
subscriber who shall not strictly and literally adhere to this 
agreement.. .out to be treated with the utmost contempt," a new
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committee of enforcement strengthened the measures within the 
association.180
The committee to enforce the boycott of British goods reflected as 
well the blending of the two competing non-importation schemes. At 
the "General Meeting of Inhabitants" it "was determined, That the 
General Resolutions" of non-importation "should be most strictly 
adhered to" with the "General Committee" empowered "to take every 
necessary and justifiable Step for preventing the least Deviation 
therefrom."181 Formed on July 22, the South Carolina Non-Importation 
Association Committee contained thirteen representatives from each of 
the three interested parties: the planters, the merchants, and the 
mechanics, thus securing mechanics equal power in enforcement.182 
Charged with gathering signatures and policing signers, the 
Committee collected 142 names by August, with the list ultimately 
growing to 268 individuals.183
The Resumption of Non-Importation
180 TheSouth Carolina and America General Gazette,} uly 24, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette, J uly 22, 
1769.
181 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, September 7 , 1769-.
182 The mechanics who were appointed to the committee included Thomas Young, John, 
Matthews, J oseph Dill, John Fullerton, William Trusler, John Pure, Theodore Trezvant, Bernard 
Beekman, Cato Ash, Simon Berwick, Joseph Verree, Daniel Cannon, and Tunis Tebout. As an 
extra-legal body, the mechanic’s participation on this committee o f enforcement established the 
precedent for their equal inclusion throughout the imperial crisis and Revolution. Interesting to 
note here, that leadership in this protest in no way presages a particular allegiance during the 
Revolutionary War. The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,27 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty. 
50.
183 South Carolina Gazette, October 5,1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty. 52; Bull to 
Hillsborough, Charleston, March 6 and October 20, 1770, PRO, CO 5/393, ff. 22,119; Maier, 
From Resistance to Revolution, 122,131-2.
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The committee to enforce the boycott of British goods reflected the 
blending of the two competing non-importation schemes. At the 
"General Meeting of Inhabitants" it "was determined, That the General 
Resolutions" of non-importation "should be most strictly adhered to" 
with the "General Committee" empowered "to take every necessary 
and justifiable Step for preventing the least Deviation therefrom."184 
Formed on July 22, the South Carolina Non-Importation Association 
Committee contained thirteen representatives from each of the three 
interested parties: the planters, the merchants, and the mechanics, thus 
securing mechanics equal power in enforcement.185 Charged with 
gathering signatures and policing signers, the Committee collected 142 
names by August, with the list ultimately growing to 268 individuals.
By December 1769, few sails could be spotted coming or going 
from Charleston Harbor, and Peter Timothy reported that only thirty 
"irreconcilable" individuals remained in the port.186 The newly formed 
committee of enforcement adopted the motto of "Sign or Die"
184 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, September 7 ,1769-.
185 The mechanics who were appointed to the committee included Thomas Young, John, 
Matthews, Joseph Dill, John Fullerton, William Trusler, John Pure, Theodore Trezvant, Bernard 
Beekman, Cato Ash, Simon Berwick,Joseph Verree, Daniel Cannon, and Tunis Tebout. As an 
extra-legal body, the mechanic’s participation on this committee o f enforcement established the 
precedent for their equal inclusion throughout the imperial crisis and Revolution. Interesting to 
note here, that leadership in this protest in no way presages a particular allegiance during the 
Revolutionary War. The South Carolina Gazette, 13, 27 July 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty. 
50.
186 Walsh SoL 51 (Fraser, Walter PPP 45)
Another witness to these happenings claimed that few ships were inte harbor in Decemeber, a 
time when the port was usually bustling. Moreover, figures show a marked decline in the overseas 
trade for the period o f the resistance to the Townsend Act -Walsh SoL 51, David MacPherson, 
Annals oCommerce (4 vol.; Edinburg, 1805).
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(sometimes "Sign or be Ruined") and harsher tactics for tactics for 
enlisting recalcitrant non-subscribers and punishing violators than 
their Stamp Act model.187 Although the summer began with 
individuals arriving a protest based upon their own ideological 
concerns and economic self interests, the push for consensus among 
the propertied interests due to fear of a massive slave and sailor 
uprisings enabled a more rigorous enforcement than many joiners 
thought either would occur or was necessary.188 The associations 
required all trade relations be suspended within one month, and 
delinquent subscribes would be handed by the elected Committee. The 
Committee decided that since "it was determined, That the General 
Resolutions...should be most strictly adhered to" strict enforcement 
was necessary to achieve results.189 In addition to this stricter 
enforcement, Charleston's now more powerful mechanic class 
organized to plans to help domestic manufacturers, including schemes 
to establish a paper mill and provide goods such as "Liberty
is? Walsh SoL 50 -  SCG -  November 16 ,23 ,30  1769, December 7 1 769,Februrary 1,14, 
September 14, 27, Oxrovwe 3 ,1 1 ,1 8 ,2 5 , November 1,8, 1700. Pr.R.,XXXII, 103, 200-201 SC 
Gazjuly 27, 1769
188 SCG Sept. 7, 1769
189 The South Carolina Gazette, September 7,1769, November 16,23,30,1769, December 7, 1769, 
February 1,14, 1769; P.R.S.C., XXXII, 103, 200-201.
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umbrellas" for "Lovers and Encouragers of American 
Manufacturers."190
Within Charleston, the voices of opposition -  like William 
Henry Drayton, John Gordon, and William Wragg -  at first expressed 
their positions in the newspaper, but soon found themselves not 
simply marginalized, but no longer part of the community. In the 
backcountry as well, men like Charles Woodmason complained that 
the Sons of Liberty and fellow Charleston residents did not care "who 
may starve so that they can but eat -  who sinks, so they swim, who 
laborers and are heavy laden, so they can keep their Equipages. Their 
throats bellow one thing. But their hands would execute the 
reverse. ..These are the Sons of Liberty."191 The economic interests and 
ideological divides beteen the merchant, planter, and mechanic 
interest before the Townshend Revenue Acts, deeply influenced the 
variety of responses to the legislation and ultimately shaped what 
individuals believed they were participating in during the resumption 
of non-importation.
*  *  *
Conclusion
190 The South Carolina Gazette, March 7, 1769, July 6, 1769, August 10,1769, September 28, 1769, 
November 30,1769, January 4, 11, 18, 1770,June 7, 1770, August 16,1770; Walsh, Charleston’s 
Sons ofTiberty, 52.
191 Quoted in Robert Woody, “Christopher Gadsden and the Stamp Act,” Proceedings cf the South 
Carolina Historical Assocaition (1939), 9; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 415-417, 434-435.
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In a summer of 1769, when drought threatened "the CORN, 
throughout the province," residents of the port of Charleston 
experienced an extraordinarily blistering few weeks.192 In a city that 
prided itself on "Harmony," the summer of 1769 proved anything but 
harmonious. From inaction to conflict to consensus, the resumption of 
protest in Charleston forced each resident of the harbor town to 
question their relationship to the British Empire and to one another. 
For every individual, the Townshend Revenue Acts forced a 
reconsideration of the port's place within the British empire, the city 
elite's persuasive power in London, and their relationship to British 
political traditions. This moment emerged from a colonial history rich 
with political strife, an economic depression literally ruining planters 
and merchants, as well as, the constant fear of disorder from sailors 
and slaves. Far from harmony -  this period of Charleston's history is 
best characterized by near constant contention, collusion, and disunion 
within the community.
In the summer of 1769, Charleston's newspaper broadsides and 
resident's private correspondence consistently echoed an anxiety 
unprecedented five years earlier. The period following the Seven 
Years War, as the British government sought to regularize the empire, 
Charleston suffered an identity crisis that deeply shaped their
192 The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769.
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participation in protest. This essay attempted to recreate how 
contemporaries understood this moment of contested protest and their 
own involvement. To dissect how colonists came to protest, this paper 
examined how Charleston residents understood their position within 
the British Empire, traced how conflict over protest arrived amid 
inaction, and uncovered the drive by the anxious whites towards 
consensus. In capturing the range of possibilities for Charleston 
citizens, the narrative suggests how individuals calculated risk versus 
reward at the intersection of ideology and self-interest to participate in 
protest.193
Where once the city conceived of itself as a central player within 
the web of empire, after the Seven Years War, suddenly the port 
appeared to be just another periphery in the eyes of London 
policymakers. As they engaged in protest, Charleston's interested 
classes continued to believe in their ability to persuade English officials 
to change imperial policies. This belief faded at varying rates for port 
residents -  quickly for those mechanics injured by the currency crisis 
and more gradually for those merchants who still relied upon imperial 
trade networks. Even as they protested, Charlestonians engaged in a 
tradition within the Empire, linking their own cause with others in
193 This paper seeks to complicate the narrative established by Pauline Maier’s From Resistance to 
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development ojAmerican Opposition to Britain, 1765- 1776. (New  
Yo rk: N  orton 1972).
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England, Scotland, and Ireland. Charleston residents participated in a 
wider, Atlantic conversation, one that increasingly appeared ignored 
by those on the far side of the Gulf Stream.
Up the coast from Charleston, the tobacco port of Norfolk -  for 
example -  echoes many of the tensions and drive to consensus found 
in Charleston. Seven of the twenty Norfolk and Portsmouth 
Committee of Correspondence members decrying the "tyranny" of 
King George during the Townshend Crisis, returned to Britain as 
loyalists after the war. Two members of the Committee actively fought 
against American independence, aiding the British army in securing 
financing and a fleet of privateers to harass the very port trade they 
once sought to protect.194 No single trajectory defined allegiance in 
pre-Revolutionary port towns; understanding the dynamism of these 
communities in protest reveals more accurately the process of 
revolution.195 Before even connecting to other colonies, capturing how 
the community itself interacted, points to how protest occurred within 
the British Empire.196
194 Hast, Adele. Eqyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore. (Ann 
Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1979.) 16.
195 Understanding the changing faces o f protest — from the non-importation associations o f the 
Stamp Act to the Coercive Acts — avoids the narrow binary o f individuals as patriot or loyalist. 
Treatment o f former protest leaders reveals not only latent antagonisms but also a high degree o f 
tolerance for dissenting opinion within the two communities. With economic connections 
spanning all areas o f American Colonies, the Caribbean, the British Isles, and the European 
continent, the cash crop merchant factors’ participation and abandonment illustrates not only 
how economic motivation underlies protest, but also the class dynamic within port communities.
196 In reading the contemporary newspapers and letters, it seems nearly impossible to conclude 
that participating in non-importation built trust or developed common understandings. From the
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Beyond simply restoring contingency in the protests prior to the 
American Revolution, by examining this contested moment of protest 
within Charleston, it is possible to reconstruct how contemporaries 
conceived of their moment, their rights, their position, and even 
themselves within the British Empire.
In choosing to protest -  in weighing the potential of risk versus 
the possibilities of reward -  Charleston's experience in the summer of 
1769 reveals how people oriented themselves within the community, 
colony, and Empire. That individuals in Charleston each arrived a 
different conclusions from this calculation should not be surprising, 
nor should the fact that each individual brought different meanings to 
joining, participating, and violating the association -  but as historians, 
we consistently overlook the dynamics of protest to paint an inevitable 
trajectory from resistance to revolution. While the story of this 
particular summer, in this odd Southern city, appears exceptional, the 
experience of this port also points towards a more complex picture of 
protest in a colonial world. Individuals in Charleston -  like those in 
Savannah, Philadelphia, Antigua, Jamaica, St. Christopher, Beaufort, 
and elsewhere -  based their actions and decision upon a calculus of
origins to the enforcement, each individual in Charleston believed they signed on, participated in, 
violated, or resisted fundamentally different associations than others within the community. No 
consensus existed within the port to build towards a common revolution in the manner that T.H. 
Breen or Pauline Maier describe. Choice was part o f the equation, but coercion and marginalizing
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economic self-interest, political ideology, and the nature of the 
community.
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